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117 
GIVING THE BAT BACK TO CASEY: 
SUGGESTIONS TO REFORM TITLE IX’S 
INEQUITABLE APPLICATION TO 
INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“I support the law’s intent of promoting equal opportunities to all 
students in a manner that does not unfairly penalize or limit 
opportunities for any students.  I am hoping . . . we can work together 
to find ways to make Title IX work to accomplish its original intent 
without causing the elimination of athletic programs.”1 
There is no doubt that during the last quarter of a century Title IX 
has forever changed, both positively and negatively, women’s sports, the 
public perception toward women, and also the composition of athletics 
in general.2  Today, there are women’s leagues in basketball, soccer, and 
softball.3  It is extremely unlikely that Pierre de Coubertin, founder of 
the modern Olympics, could ever have envisioned such enormous 
popularity for women’s sports.4 
                                                          
 1. Q & A: The Candidates on College Issues, 25 CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC. A32, Feb. 
25, 2000.  (quoting Senator John McCain when asked whether the federal government has gone too 
far in its enforcement of Title IX).  See id.  For other quotes dealing with opposing views of Title 
IX, see Ed Sherman, New Athletic Rivalry: Men v. Women, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Jan. 24, 1993, at 
C1. 
 2. JAMES P. ROHR, AN APPRAISAL OF PRACTICES & POLICIES IN INTERCOLLEGIATE 
ATHLETICS IN THE MID AMERICAN CONFERENCE ESSENTIAL FOR COMPLIANCE WITH TITLE IX OF 
THE EDUCATIONAL AMENDMENTS OF 1972 28 (1978). 
 3. Ellen M. Zavian, Work Injuries & Legal Aspects of the Sports Industry 2000, 591 
P.L.I./PAT. 321, 323-28 (2000) (listing the opportunities for women in professional sports: Women’s 
basketball, Professional Softball League, Professional Soccer, Professional Football League, 
Professional Golfing, Women’s Tennis Association, Professional Volleyball, Professional Hockey, 
Professional Baseball League).  See also Ellen E. Dabbs, Intentional Fouls: Athletes and Violence 
Against Women, 31 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 167, 194 n.160 (1998). 
 4. He believed that “the Olympic games must be reserved for men . . . we must . . . achieve 
the following definition: the solemn and periodic exaltation of male athleticism, with 
internationalism as a base . . . and female applause as a reward.”  GRETA L. COHEN, WOMEN IN 
SPORT: ISSUES AND CONTROVERSIES 169 (1993).  See also SUSAN BIRRELL & CHERYL L. COLE, 
WOMEN, SPORT, & CULTURE 112 (1994) (discussing the growth of women’s sports); D. MARGARET 
1
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Despite the advancing popularity for women’s sports, Title IX has 
now become inadequate and static and will remain this way unless 
change is swiftly mandated.5  Because of this recent transformation, 
numerous “unintended consequences” permeate the statute’s surface 
when courts attempt to apply Title IX.6  The most notable of these 
negative consequences is the ever-increasing popularity of eliminating 
low revenue men’s athletic teams.7 
Instead of promoting equality, Title IX is driven to attain equality 
even if young men and minority women have their dreams and 
aspirations shattered.8  The feeling of many athletic directors, both male 
and female, is summed up in one quote: “I’m for gender equity, but not 
at the expense of cutting opportunities for men.”9 
These unintended circumstances arrive from the courts’ obsessive 
and incorrect focus on “strict proportionality” and the undergraduate 
population of the institution.10  Compounding the problem is that the 
                                                          
COSTA & SHARON R. GUTHERIE, WOMEN IN SPORT: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 325-26 
(1994) (talking about how the growth in women’s sports has led to a decline of women in leadership 
positions). 
 5. Matthew L. Daniel, Title IX and Gender Equity in College Athletics: How Honesty Might 
Avert a Crisis, 1995 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 255, 256 (1995).  This inadequacy label arises from the 
fact that a majority of institutions, after all these years, still do not comply with Title IX.  NCAA 
Study:
 
More Women Playing Sports, USA TODAY, Feb. 16, 1995, at 10C. 
 6. Crista D. Leahy, The Title Bout: A Critical Review of the Regulation and Enforcement of 
Title IX In Intercollegiate Athletics, 24 J.C. & U.L. 489, 503 (1998). 
 7. Ross A. Jurewitz, Playing at Even Strength: Reforming Title IX Enforcement in 
Intercollegiate Athletics, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 283, 351 n.17 (2000) (showing 
several examples of men’s teams being cut). For examples of men’s teams being eliminated because 
of Title IX and budget constraints see Mike Decourcy, UC Will Cut 3 Men’s Sports; Women’s 
Programs Adjusted for Equity, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, May 7, 1998, at A1, Eric Noland, Nothing 
Easy for CSUN: Athletic Department Faces Tough Choices, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 25, 1997, at 
S1 and Ryan White, PSU Closes Door on Baseball, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, May 30, 1998, at C1. 
 8. Jessica Gavora, Quota System Hurts Team, USA TODAY, July 23, 1996, at 14A.  Ms. 
Gavora notes that the teams added to an institution under a Title IX claim are teams that have very 
little minority participation and greatly benefit only Caucasian women.  Id.  Sports such as softball, 
lacrosse, crew and tennis are sports not frequently played in the inner city.  Id.  Caucasian women 
participate in these sports at an alarmingly higher rate than do minority women.  Id. 
 9. Sherman, supra note 1, at C1 (quoting Notre Dame Athletic Director Dick Rosenthal).  At 
the time, Mr. Rosenthal was a member of the NCAA’s Gender Equity Task Force.  Id.  Rev. E. 
William Beauchamp, the executive vice president of Notre Dame, correctly stated the intended 
purpose of Title IX when he said “we don’t tell our engineering department it has to have the same 
number of men and women, we don’t do anything like that anywhere in our institution.  It’s based 
on interest.” Id. 
 10. See infra notes 90-113 and accompanying text.  If the courts wish to employ the original 
intent of the statute to a Title IX complaint, they need to apply the correct “qualified applicant 
pool.”  See infra notes 195-213 and accompanying text (showing the correct comparison is between 
the opportunities available to women and those women who have the interest and ability to compete 
2
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Office of Civil Rights (OCR) never took into account the need for 
budget constraints within an athletic department.11  This monetary 
limitation on athletic departments has led institutions to eliminate male 
athletic teams as the only way to comply with Title IX.12 
Part II discusses the purpose behind Title IX, its legislative history, 
and its “flawed” modern day application to intercollegiate athletics.13  
Part III critically examines how the majority of courts have incorrectly 
construed Title IX, and also focuses upon the shocking results between 
the success rate of male and female plaintiffs.14 
Part IV supplies reasoning and analysis why Title IX is inapplicable 
to athletics, notwithstanding the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987.15  
Finally, as an alternative to Part IV, Part V offers several suggestions 
that institutions and courts can experiment with in hope of complying 
with Title IX without the need to eliminate athletic teams.16 
II.  HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION OF TITLE IX 
The development of Title IX, as a component to the Educational 
Amendment of 1972,17 came about because of the overwhelming desire 
for a continuation of the Civil Rights legislation that flooded America 
throughout the 1960’s and early 1970’s.18  Title IX’s ultimate purpose, 
                                                          
in intercollegiate athletics). 
 11. Cf. Charles P. Beveridge, Note, Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics: When Schools Cut 
Men’s Athletic Teams, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 809, 810 (1996). 
 12. Id.  For a general discussion on budget constraints see John C. Weistart, Can Gender 
Equity Find a Place in Commercialized College Sports?, 3 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 191 
(1996). 
 13. See infra notes 17-82 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra notes 83-168 and accompanying text. 
 15. See infra notes 169-94 and accompanying text.  See also 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1994). 
 16. See infra notes 195-276 and accompanying text.  This Comment in no way objurgates the 
progress that women have made while constantly confronted with obstacles in pursuit of equality in 
athletics.  The progress over the past several decades has been beneficial for sports as a whole; 
however, this Comment concludes that Title IX’s modern application is a detriment to sports in 
general and a crippling force to future male athletes.  This Comment proposes the reformation of 
Title IX so courts can carry into effect its original intent.  This reformation will in turn expurgate the 
unintended consequences that plague today’s male athlete and their respective institutions.  At the 
same time, it will keep intact the hopes and dreams of female students by providing them with the 
opportunities needed to participate in athletics. 
 17. 20 U.S.C. § 7232 (1994).  The basic goals of the Amendment are to (1) promote gender 
equity, (2) promote financial assistance, and (3) promote equity in education for women and girls.  § 
7232. 
 18. Daniel, supra note 5, at 262.  See also KAREN TOKARZ, WOMEN, SPORTS, AND LAW: A 
COMPREHENSIVE RESEARCH GUIDE TO SEX DISCRIMINATION IN SPORTS I (1986) (talking about the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 producing results in employment); Stephen J. Shapiro, Section 1983 
3
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whether stated or unstated, is to prevent sex discrimination against 
people in programs that receive federal funding.19  However, because the 
legislative history of Title IX is almost completely void of hearings and 
committee reports, little is known about the statute other than its primary 
purpose.20 
The statute, in pertinent part, states “no person in the United States 
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied 
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any educational 
program or activity receiving Federal Financial Assistance.”21 
The prohibition against sex discrimination closely mirrors the 
provisions of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.22  One aspect 
evident from a reading of Title VI’s history and case law is that it finds 
the use of quotas, as a means to attain the statute’s goal, to be 
reprehensible and prohibited.23  This dislike for quotas carried over into 
Title IX.24 
                                                          
Claims to Redress Discrimination in Public Employment: Are They Preempted by Title VII?, 35 AM. 
U. L. REV. 93, 95 (1985). 
 19. Deborah Brake & Elizabeth Catlin, The Path of Most Resistance: The Long Road Toward 
Gender Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics, 3 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 51, 53 (1996) (stating 
Title IX’s enactment was in response to the overwhelming discrimination that women were 
experiencing in all levels and activities of education).  See also Rikki Ades, The Opportunity to Play 
Ball: Title IX, University Compliance and Equal Pay, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 347, 349 
(1997); ELLEN J. VARGYAS, BREAKING DOWN BARRIERS: A LEGAL GUIDE TO TITLE IX 6 (1994). 
 20. See generally Jill K. Johnson, Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics: Current Judicial 
Interpretation of the Standards for
 
Compliance, 74 B.U. L. REV. 553 (1994).  The hearings that did 
take place were lead by Representative Edith Green in 1970.  Daniel, supra note 5, at 290.  
Throughout the hearings, numerous witnesses testified that a number of sex discrimination 
complaints came from educational institutions.  Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 
696 n.16 (1979) (talking about Rep. Green’s involvement in one of the only hearings on Title IX). 
 21. 20 U.S.C. §1681(a) (1994).  The statute exempts several institutions from compliance 
with Title IX, parochial schools, military schools, and single sex schools.  § 1681(a)(3)-(5).  
However, a further reading of the statute reveals that Congress intended the majority of the schools 
to be regulated by this law.  § 1681(c). 
 22. Walter B. Connolly, Jr., & Jeffrey D. Adelman, A University’s Defense to a Title IX 
Gender Equity in Athletics Lawsuit: Congress Never Intended Gender Equity Based on Student 
Body Ratios, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 845, 849 (1994).  See also Haffer v. Temple Univ., 678 F. 
Supp. 517, 539 (E.D. Pa. 1987).  The language of Title VI states that “no person in the United States 
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied 
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal 
Financial Assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1994). 
 23. Connolly, supra note 22, at 849-50.  The author notes that nowhere in the case law, 
regulations, or history is there found any statement that promotes the use of “affirmative action, 
quotas, or the meeting of a specified percentage of participation for universities. . . .”  Id. 
 24. See infra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.  See also Darryl C. Wilson, Title IX’s 
Collegiate Sport Exception Raises Serious Questions Regarding the Role of the NCAA, 31 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 1303, 1306 n.27 (1998).  Senator Bayh, the Senate sponsor, stated “this 
4
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To ensure that Title IX did not require a certain number of each 
gender in a program or activity, Congress added §1681(b) to the 
statute.25  Representative Quie, the House sponsor, also expressed his 
concern and dislike toward the use of quotas as applied to Title IX.26  
Taking into account these concerns, the House Committee on Education 
and Labor voted affirmatively for the use of §1681(b) by a vote of 90 to 
1.27  Finally, on July 1, 1972, Title IX went into effect.28 
Amidst the debates and conferences on the use of quotas, the most 
controversial question concerned Title IX’s scope.29  The language of 
                                                          
amendment is not designed to require specific quotas . . . what we are saying is that we are striking 
down quotas.  The thrust of the amendment is to do away with every quota.”  117 CONG. REC. 30, 
409 (1971).  Senator Bayh’s statement was in response to a question posed on whether Title IX 
would require a school to maintain specific numeric proportions (50% men and 50% women).  
Donald C. Mahoney, Taking a Shot at the Title: A Critical Review of Judicial and Administrative 
Interpretations of Title IX as Applied to Intercollegiate Athletic Programs, 27 CONN. L. REV. 943, 
945-46 (1995). 
 25. Mahoney, supra note 24, at 946.  Section 1681(b) reads in part: 
Nothing contained in subsection (a) of this section shall be interpreted to require any educational 
institution to grant preferential treatment to the members of one sex on account of an imbalance 
which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of that sex participating 
in or receiving benefits of any federally supported program or activity, in comparison with the 
number or percentage of persons of that sex in any community, State, section, or other area. 
 26. In support of § 1681(b), Representative Quie stated “that to make absolutely certain there 
will not be a requirement of quotas in the graduate institutions and employment in the institutions of 
higher education similar to the prohibition against preferential treatment for minorities under the 
Civil Rights Act, I believe this legislation is necessary.”  117 CONG. REC. 39, 261-62 (1971). In 
addition to Quie’s statements, Edith Green, acting as chairperson of a Special House Subcommittee 
on Education, stated with respect to subsection (b) that in “my way of thinking, a quota system 
would hurt our colleges and universities.  I am opposed to it even in terms of attempting to end 
discrimination on the basis of sex.”  Mahoney, supra note 24, at 947.  Senator John Beall, when 
speaking on Title IX stated “I hope it is the intent of the Senate in adopting the amendment that we 
are desirous of eliminating the sex discrimination that has taken place in education.  As we 
eliminate this, I hope that we are not establishing still another form of bias . . . .”  Id. at 948.  
Senator Bayh’s statement in response to Julian H. Levi declared “I did not include such a provision 
as part of the Senate amendment because I believe my amendment already states . . . no person, 
male or female, shall be subjected to discrimination.  The language of my amendment does not 
require reverse discrimination.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Finally, Senator Claiborne Pell stated “we 
must be sure that this type of amendment is not used to establish quotas for sex . . . .”  Id. 
 27. 117 CONG. REC. 39,262 (1971). 
 28. Charlie James Harris, Jr., Message to the Judiciary: The Proper Application of Title IX 
May Save Our Children, 63 UMKC L. REV. 429, 432 (1995).  See also David Aronberg, Crumbling 
Foundations: Why Recent Judicial and Legislative Challenges to Title IX May
 
Signal its Demise, 47 
FLA. L. REV. 741, 747 (1995). 
 29. Jeffrey P. Ferrier, Title IX Leaves Some Athletes Asking,”Can We Play Too?,” 44 CATH. 
U. L. REV. 841, 846 (1995).  See also Joseph E. Krakora, Note, The Application of Title IX to 
School Athletic Programs, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 222, 223 (stating that “the legislative history of 
Title IX does not clarify the proper scope of the application of Title IX to a school’s athletic 
program”). 
5
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Title IX is filled with broad strokes of “legalese,” rendering the 
legislative history insufficient to decipher its exact meaning and scope.30  
Because athletics is sparsely mentioned within Title IX’s legislative 
history, significant debate arose as to whether Congress originally 
intended Title IX to apply to intercollegiate athletics.31 
The problem in the interpretation lies with the phrase “any 
educational program or activity receiving Federal Financial 
Assistance.”32  Significant debate emanated from these words because 
very few athletic programs directly receive federal financial aid.33  What 
ultimately arose from Congress’s inability to pass a statute with clarity 
were two views on whether the mandates of Title IX cover 
intercollegiate athletic programs. 34 One view, and the view applicable 
today, is the “institutional-wide” approach,35 while the other, more 
narrowly construed view, is the “program-specific” approach.36 
                                                          
 30. Claudia S. Lewis, Note, Title IX of the 1972 Educational Amendments: Harmonizing its 
Restrictive Language With its Broad Remedial Purpose, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 1043, 1049-50 
(1983) (deciphering Title IX’s statutory language).  Because of the ambiguous meaning, the 
legislative history and definition of Title IX came about through “litigation” and “administrative 
policy interpretations.”  Andrea M. Giampetro-Meyer, Recognizing and Remedying Individual and 
Institutional Gender-Based Wage Discrimination In Sport, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 343, 362 (2000). 
 31. Thomas A. Cox, Intercollegiate Athletics and Title IX, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 34, 36 
n.11 (1977) (“[T]itle IX provides little indication whether Congress intended the statute to apply to 
athletic programs.”).  Senator Bayh stated that: 
Title IX’s purpose was to provide equal access for men and women students to the educational 
process and the extracurricular activities in a school, where there is not a unique facet such as 
football involved.  We are not requiring that intercollegiate football be desegregated, nor that the 
men’s locker room be desegregated. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 32. B. Glenn George, Miles to Go and Promise to Keep, A Case Study of Title IX, 64 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 555, 556 (1994).  See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994) for the complete statutory 
language. 
 33. Deidre G. Duncan, Gender Equity in Women’s Athletics, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 1027, 1030 
(1996). Most of the athletic departments do not directly receive federal financial aid.  Krakora, 
supra
 note 29, at 223. 
 34. See generally Jennifer Lynn Botelho, The Cohen Courts’ Reading of Title IX: Does it 
Really Promote a De Facto Quota Scheme?, 33 NEW. ENG. L. REV. 743 (1999); Note, Bump, Set, 
Spiked: Determining Whether the National Collegiate Athletic Association is a Recipient of Federal 
Funds under Title IX, 65 MO. L. REV. 773 (2000); Stephanie M. Greene, Regulating the NCAA: 
Making the Calls Under the Sherman Antitrust Act and Title IX, 52 ME. L. REV. 81 (2000). 
 35. Brian L. Porto, The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same: Title IX and the 
Batter For Gender Equity In College Sports, 41 NOV. RES GESTAE 26, 28 (1997).  See also Denise 
K. Stellmach, Title IX: The Mandate for Equality in Collegiate Athletics, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 203, 
204-05 (1994). 
 36. Ted Riley Cheesebrough, Cohen v. Brown: I Am Woman, Hear Me Score, 5 VILL. SPORTS 
& ENT. L.J. 295, 298-99 (1998).  See also Curtis L. Hollinger, Jr., Are Male College Sports in 
Jeopardy? A Look at Kelly v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 21 S.U. L. REV. 151, 
154-56 (1994); Sue Ann Mota, Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics- the First Circuit Holds Brown 
6
Akron Law Review, Vol. 35 [2002], Iss. 1, Art. 5
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol35/iss1/5
REUSCHER1.DOC 1/2/02  1:34 PM 
2001] GIVING THE BAT BACK TO CASEY 123 
 
The concept of the “institutional-wide” approach is that if any part 
of the institution received federal funds, the whole institution is required 
by law to comply with Title IX.37 On the other hand, the “program-
specific” approach focuses only upon the specific program or activity 
that receives the federal funding.38  Unlike the institutional approach, 
this approach only requires the specific recipient program or activity to 
comply with Title IX.39  If the “program-specific” approach is followed, 
it would not affect athletic departments because the majority of 
intercollegiate athletic programs do not receive federal funding.40 
Unfortunately, the text of Title VI is ambiguous, and any reference 
to that statute is of little, if any, assistance in determining which 
approach to apply.41  While opponents of the “program-specific” 
approach argue that this uncertainty of application disadvantaged women 
athletes, studies show an opposite conclusion.42 
Following the enactment of Title IX, the public demanded to know 
whether Title IX applied to intercollegiate athletics.43  After several 
                                                          
University not in Compliance, 14 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 152, 162-63 (1997). 
 37. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Henderson, Gender Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics: A 
Commitment to Fairness, 5 SETON HALL J. OF SPORT L. 133, 136 (1995).  The institutional-wide 
approach, also known as “free-up,” bases its foundation on the fact the whole school is the 
beneficiary of federal funds.  P. Michael Villalobos, The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987: 
Revitalization of Title IX, 1 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 149, 159 (1990).  The benefit arises because the 
university frees up money from a variety of other sources for collective uses.  Id.  This concept 
follows the notion that if one part of the institution receives funding then Title IX covers the whole 
institution.  Porto, supra note 35, at 28.  Even though the majority of athletic departments do not 
receive federal funds, this theory would cover their department along with the rest of the 
departments at the institution.  Id. 
 38. Henderson, supra note 37, at 136. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Duncan, supra note 33, at 1030. 
 41. Dianne M. Piche, Grove City College v. Bell and Program-Specificity: Narrowing the 
Scope of Federal Civil Rights
 
Statutes, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 1087, 1097 (1985).  However, there is 
some evidence that early judicial decisions regarding the scope and application of Title VI point to a 
institutional wide approach.  C.f. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (holding that since the district 
received federal funds, the whole system must comply with Title VI); Marable v. Alabama Mental 
Health Bd., 297 F. Supp 291 (M.D. Ala. 1969) (holding that a mental hospital can have its funding 
terminated for violations of Title VI); Flanagan v. President & Dirs. of Georgetown College, 417 F. 
Supp. 377 (D.D.C. 1976) (holding that receipt of money for law school required entire college to 
comply with Title VI). 
 42. Within the first four years of Title IX’s passage, participation in women’s athletics 
increased at a rate of 600%.  Joan O’Brien, The Unlevel Playing Field, SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Sept. 
4, 1994, at A1.  In fact, women’s athletics and participation grew substantially over the first several 
years of Title IX’s application, even without applying the institutional wide approach.  Id. 
 43. Diane M. Henson & Boyce E. Cabaniss, It’s not Whether You Win or Lose, but Whether 
You Get to Play: Title IX Finally Expands Participation Opportunities for Female Athletes in the 
90’s, 13 REV. LITIG. 495, 500 (1994). 
7
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years of hearings and debates, it appeared a foregone conclusion that 
Title IX would now cover athletics.44  Because of this perception, a 
number of amendments were proposed.45 
The amendment that gathered the most force in Congress was the 
Tower Amendment, proposed by Senator John Tower.46  This 
amendment was the only amendment to gain approval within the 
Senate.47  However, it eventually met its demise at the hands of a House-
Senate Conference Committee.48 
As a compromise to both views, Congress enacted the Javitz 
Amendment.49  This amendment required the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare (HEW) to finish regulations for Title IX that 
“shall include with respect to intercollegiate athletics . . . reasonable 
provisions considering the nature of particular sports.”50 
In 1975, the HEW proposed its regulations dealing with Title IX, 
and within the next several months the HEW received 9700 comments 
and complaints dealing with the ambiguity of the regulations.51  Due to 
                                                          
 44. Leahy, supra note 6, at 495-97. 
 45. Cox, supra note 31, at 36 n.13 (noting that the Senate-passed version of the 1974 
Education Amendments excluded intercollegiate activity that produces some percentage of 
revenue).  The Amendments called either for an exemption of athletics as a whole or for certain 
revenue producing sports.  Id. 
 46. PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW 624 (1993); See also 120 
CONG. REC. 15,322 (1974).  The original intent of the amendment was to exempt intercollegiate 
athletics as a whole, but when it was certain this plan would fail miserably, it was limited to an 
exception for certain revenue producing sports.  Aronberg, supra note 28, at 751.  Many believed 
that the amendment was necessary because revenue producing sports cause the largest disparity 
between the two sexes.  Johnson, supra note 20, at 586; See also 120 CONG. REC. 15,322 (1974). 
 47. Cox, supra note 31, at 36 n.15 
 48. Mahoney, supra note 24, at 950. The Committee claimed that the Amendment was too 
broad in scope, as it exempted not only revenues that the sport produces, but also any donations that 
both private and public donors wished to give.  Philip Anderson, Football School’s Guide To 
Compliance, 2 SPORTS L.J. 75, 98 (1995). 
 49. Mahoney, supra note 24, at 950.  For a general history on the Javits Amendment see 
Charles Spitz, Gender Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics as Mandated by Title IX of the Educational 
Amendments Act of 1972: Fair or Foul?, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J., 621, 627 (1997).  The Javits 
Amendment better suited the “intent” of Congress by disallowing certain sport exemptions.  Jodi 
Hudson, Complying With Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972: The Never Ending Race to 
the Finish Line, 5 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 575, 578 (1995). 
 50. Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 884, 88 Stat. 484 (1974) (codified 
at 20 U.S.C. § 1681).  See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 24, at 950.  For an opposing viewpoint, see 
Janet Lammersen Kuhn, Title IX: Employment and Athletics are Outside HEW’s Jurisdiction, 65 
GEO. L.J. 49 (1976), concluding that Title IX does not apply to employment or intercollegiate 
athletics. 
 51. Mahoney, supra note 24, at 977 n.33 (citing 39 Fed. Reg. 22,228-38 (1974)).  See also 
SALLY HATTIG, A STUDY OF PROGRESS TOWARD GENDER EQUITY IN THE INTERCOLLEGIATE 
ATHLETIC PROGRAM AT A MAJOR RESEARCH INSTITUTION 55 (1994). 
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this overwhelming response, the HEW deleted two provisions52 before 
the final regulations became effective in July of 1975.53  These 
regulations gave an institution three years to comply with Title IX or 
face a possible loss of future federal funding.54 
From 1975 to early 1979, the HEW received numerous complaints 
stating that the regulations were extremely ambiguous and of little help 
in solving the gender-equity dilemma.55  In response to these complaints, 
the OCR published a “Policy Interpretation” to help clarify the 
provisions within the regulations that dealt with intercollegiate 
athletics.56  The “Interpretation” set forth the “Effective 
                                                          
 52. The first provision entitled, “Determination of Student Interest,” stated “a school which 
operates or sponsors athletics shall determine at least annually, using a method to be selected by the 
recipient which is acceptable to the Director of the HEW, in what sports members of each sex 
would desire to compete.”  Jurewitz, supra note 7, at 295-96; 39 Fed. Reg. 22,236 (1974).  The 
second provision entitled “affirmative efforts” stated that: 
A recipient which operates or sponsors athletic activities shall, with regard to member of a sex for 
which athletic opportunities previously have been limited, make affirmative efforts to: (1) Inform 
member of such sex of the availability for them of the athletic opportunities available for member of 
the other sex and of the nature of those opportunities, and (2) provide support and training activities 
for members of such sex designed to improve and expand their capabilities and interest to 
participate in such opportunities. 
Id. 
 53. 34 C.F.R. § 106.1 (2000) (“purpose and effective date”). 
 54. 34 C.F.R § 106.41(d).  See also Duncan, supra note 33, at 1031.  To comply with the 
requirements of Title IX the institution must provide “equal opportunity” for all persons involved.  
34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c).  The regulations list 10 factors to evaluate in determining whether an 
institution is in full compliance.  These factors are: 
Whether the selection of sports and levels of competition effectively accommodate the interests and 
abilities of both sexes; 
The provisions of equipment and supplies; 
Scheduling of games and practice time; 
Travel and per diem allowance; 
Opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring; 
Assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors; 
Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities; 
Provision of medical and training facilities and services 
Provisions of housing and dining facilities and services; 
Publicity. 
34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c).  See also ROHR, supra note 2, at 10.  It is clear that the HEW saw Title IX as 
applying to any athletic program run by the institution regardless if federal funding given to the 
institution ever reached the athletic program. Porto, supra note 37, at 361(noting that the sound 
defeat of the Tower Amendment clearly shows that Title IX covers all sports, regardless if federal 
funding ever reaches the athletic department).  See also 45 C.F.R. § 86.2(h) (2000) (defining 
recipient in a manner that allows it to be applied to the institution as a whole). 
 55. Spitz, supra note 49, at 627-29.  See generally MARY JO FESTLE, PLAYING NICE: 
POLITICS AND APOLOGIES IN WOMEN’S SPORTS 167 (1996). 
 56. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (1979). The goal of the interpretation was to assist those governed by 
Title IX and to ensure a greater rate of compliance.  Mahoney, supra note 24, at 954; Duncan, supra 
9
Reuscher: Giving the Bat Back to Casey
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2002
REUSCHER1.DOC 1/2/02  1:34 PM 
126 AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:1 
 
Accommodation” section, which if followed, ensures compliance with 
Title IX.57 This section applies a three-part test to which the institution 
must satisfy one of three prongs.58 
Prong I permits an institution “which does not wish to engage in 
extensive compliance analysis to stay on the sunny side of Title IX by 
maintaining gender parity between its student body and its athletic 
body.”59  This requires athletic participation for male and female athletes 
to be substantially proportionate to their specific enrollment at the 
institution.60 
                                                          
note 33, at 1031. 
 57. Beveridge, supra note 11, at 820; Spitz, supra note 49, at 629.  The effective 
accommodation test has been the most litigated section of the “Policy Interpretation.”  Jerry R. 
Parkinson, Grappling With Gender Equity, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 75, 78-89 (1996).  The 
Interpretation set for three categories that it examined in conjunction with a Title IX complaint: (1) 
Effective Accommodation of Student’s Interests and Abilities, (2) Equivalence in Athletic Benefits 
and Opportunities, and (3) Athletic Financial Assistance and Scholarships. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 
(1979). 
 58. Parkinson, supra note 57, at 86-87. To comply with the Effective Accommodation Test, 
an institution must satisfy one of the following: 
Whether intercollegiate level participation opportunities for male and female 
athletes are provided in numbers substantially proportionate to their respective 
enrollments; or 
Where the members of one sex have been and are underrepresented among 
intercollegiate athletes, 
whether the institution can show a history and continuing practice of program 
expansion which is demonstrably responsive to the developing interest and 
abilities of the members of that sex; or 
Where the members of one sex are unrepresented among intercollegiate 
athletes, and the institution 
cannot show a history and continuing practice of program expansion such as 
that cited above, whether it can be demonstrated that the interests and abilities 
of the members of that sex have been fully and effectively accommodated by 
the present program. 
Id.  VALARIE BONNETTE, ACHIEVING GENDER EQUITY: A BASIC GUIDE TO TITLE IX & GENDER 
EQUITY IN ATHLETICS FOR COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES II-5, II 23-29 (1996).  The three-part test 
has become the most controversial aspect of Title IX.  James C. Hanks et al., Recent Developments 
in Public Education Law, 29 URB. LAW. 837, 869 (1997). 
 59. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d  888, 897-98 (1st Cir. 1993).  See infra note outlining the 
prior and subsequent history (labeling this prong as a “safe harbor”).  See, e.g., Robert H. Hunt, 
Implementation and Modification of Title IX Standards: The Evolution of Athletics Policy, 1999 
BYU EDUC. & L.J. 51, 73 (1999). 
 60. Beveridge, supra note 11, at 820.  If the plaintiff fails to show a large enough disparity, 
using percentages, the institution is presumed to be in compliance with the law.  Cohen v. Brown 
Univ., 879 F. Supp. 185, 200 (1995).  Judge Pettine stated “I conclude that an institution satisfies 
prong one provided that the gender balance of its intercollegiate athletic program substantially 
mirrors the gender balance of its student enrollment.”  Id.  As will be discussed in Part V of this 
article, the majority of criticism comes from the fact that the interpretation of this prong requires an 
institution to install a quota system to comply with Title IX.  See Eugene G. Bernardo II, 
10
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If the institution fails to comply with Prong I (Substantial 
Proportionality), it will next have the opportunity to comply with Prong 
II (Program Expansion).61  The major concern with satisfying Prong II is 
that there is no definition as to what “historic” or “continuing” 
expansion means or encompasses.62  The OCR considers several factors 
in making its determination whether an institution complies with Prong 
II.63  However, because such deference is given to Prong I as 
establishing institutional compliance, it seems unlikely that an institution 
failing to satisfy Prong I will be able to satisfy Prong II.64 
Finally, Prong III (Full Accommodation) allows a school to satisfy 
Title IX by showing a “full and effective” accommodation of women’s 
interests.65  A court will take into account whether there exists (a) an 
unmet interest in a particular sport, (b) sufficient ability to sustain a team 
in that sport, and (c) a reasonable expectation of competition for that 
team.66 If one of these factors is present, it is prima facie evidence that 
an institution has failed in its attempt or lack thereof to comply with 
Title IX.67 
The athletic success that women enjoyed from 1979 to 1984 came 
to an abrupt halt with the Supreme Court’s decision in Grove City 
College v. Bell.68  The Court finally had the opportunity to address the 
                                                          
Unsportsmanlike Conduct: Title IX and Cohen v. Brown University, 2 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 
305, 341 (1997).  See also infra notes 194-212 and accompanying text.  This quota system would be 
unnecessary if the courts would use the correct statistical pool in determining whether substantial 
proportionality exists.  Id. 
 61. See supra note 58 (listing the prongs of the three part test). 
 62. Jurewitz, supra note 7, at 300.  But see Cohen, 991 F.2d at 898 (stating that Prong II is 
clear in its requirement of what continuous expansion of women’s athletic teams means). 
 63. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., CLARIFICATION OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETIC POLICY 
GUIDANCE: THE THREE -PART TEST 6 (1995).  These factors include, but are not limited to, a 
school’s history in adding teams, and the overall number of participants who are part of the 
unrepresented sex.  Id. 
 64. Botelho, supra note 34, at 784-85.  Courts have held that when a school cuts a woman’s 
team it fails Prong II of the Effective Accommodation Test.  Connolly, supra note 24, at 846 n.1; 
Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 998 F.3d 824, 830 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that “we recognize that 
in time of economic hardships, few schools will be able to satisfy Title IX’s effective 
accommodation requirement by continuing to expand their women’s athletic programs”).  But see 
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 63, at 8 (showing an example of a school cutting a woman’s team 
and still complying with Prong II). 
 65. See supra note 58 (listing the prongs of the three part test). 
 66. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,417-71,418 (1979).  See also Beveridge, supra note 11, at 821. 
 67. Spitz, supra note 49, at 631. 
 68. Grove City College v. Bell 465 U.S. 555 (1984).  Grove City declined to participate in 
direct institutional aid programs and federal student assistance programs.  Id. at 559.  The College 
has several students that receive a Basic Educational Opportunity Grant.  Id.  The HEW determined 
that Grove City was a recipient of federal funds under Title IX.  Id. at 560.  HEW request Grove 
11
Reuscher: Giving the Bat Back to Casey
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2002
REUSCHER1.DOC 1/2/02  1:34 PM 
128 AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:1 
 
issue of whether Title IX applied a “program specific” or an 
“institutional-wide” approach.69  The Court also had the opportunity to 
put to rest the indecision that had plagued the lower courts for several 
years.70  The Court held that only the specific program that receives 
federal financial aid is subjected to the regulations imposed by Title 
IX.71  In compliance with the Court’s decision, HEW withdrew from 
Title IX investigations against several institutions.72 
Angered by the decision in Grove City College,73 Congress knew 
swift measures were needed to ensure the progression of gender equity 
throughout the athletic world.74  To accomplish this goal, Congress 
needed to alter the meaning of “program and activity.” 75  The final 
product was the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987.76  Although 
                                                          
City to execute an assurance to comply, but when it refused HEW instituted proceedings to have the 
College and students declared ineligible to receive BEOG’s.  Id. at 560-61.  Grove City and several 
students filed suit in the Western District of Pennsylvania.  Id. at 561.  For an excellent discussion 
of the case see FESTLE, supra note 55, at 219-22. 
 69. Daniel, supra note 5, at 265. 
 70. Rice v. Harvard College, 663 F.2d 331, 338-39 (1st Cir. 1981) (holding that Title IX 
requires a program specific approach); University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Va. 
1982) (denying a Title IX claim against an athletic department because it was not a recipient of 
federal funds); Haffer v. Temple Univ., 688 F.2d 14 (3rd Cir. 1982) (implementing an institutional 
wide approach to Title IX claims), aff’d 678 F. Supp. 517 (E.D. Pa. 1987). 
 71. Grove City College, 465 U.S. at 573-74. 
 72. Cohen v. Brown Univ. 991 F.2d 888, 894 n.5 (1993).  Other sources vary significantly on 
the actual number of investigations that were suspended after the Grove City College decision.  One 
commentator found twenty-three investigations were already pending litigation.  DONNA A. 
LOPIANO & CONNEE ZOTUS, EQUALITY ISSUES & POLICY PROBLEMS IN WOMEN’S 
INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, in THE RULES OF THE GAME 31, 32 (Richard E. Lapchick & John B. 
Slaughter eds., 1989).  Others say that HEW dropped sixty-nine investigations.  Craig Neff, Equity 
at Last, Part II, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 21, 1988, at 70.  The only thing that is clear is that the 
actual number of investigations dropped is still unknown today. 
 73. Grove City College, 465 U.S. at 555. 
 74. 117 CONG REC. 30,155-56; 39,261-62 (1971).  Congress believed that the Grove City 
College
 decision was indeed contrary to Title IX’s original intent, and if Grove City College 
remained binding, Title IX would become useless.  Id. 
 75. 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1994).  See also 130 CONG. REC. 25,602 (1984) (discussion by Sen. 
Hatch) (“I personally do not know if any Senator in the Senate . . . who does not want Title IX 
implemented so as to continue to encourage women throughout America to develop into . . . 
athletes.”). 
 76. 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1994).  The Statute states in pertinent part: 
For the purpose of this chapter, the term “program or activity” . . . mean all of the following 
operations of- 
(1)(A) a department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or of a local 
government; or 
(2)(A) a college, university, or other post secondary institution, or a public school system of higher 
education; or (B) a local educational agency . . . system of vocational education, or other school 
system. 
12
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President Reagan vetoed the proposed Act, Congress overrode his veto.77  
With the passage of this Act came the anticipated arrival of the 
“institutional-wide” approach.78  However, as mentioned above, this 
approach is contrary to the historic intent and judicial decisions 
concerning Title VI and Title IX.79 
In 1990, the OCR, in promoting guidance for Title IX Investigators, 
published the Title IX Athletics Investigators Manual.80  Included within 
the Manual is a list of questions and statistics that an investigator may 
ask and subsequently discover from an institution in order to conduct a 
thorough Title IX investigation.81  However, the Manual contains several 
material inconsistencies that are in direct opposition with the Policy 
Interpretation and with the history of Title IX.82 
III.  JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTRUCTION OF TITLE IX 
A.  Enforcement of Title IX by Private Individuals 
Shortly after the widespread acceptance of the HEW’s regulations, 
the Supreme Court decided Cannon v. University of Chicago.83  The 
                                                          
20 U.S.C. § 1687.  Located in the history of the Act, Congress found that “(1) certain aspects of 
recent decisions of the Supreme Court have unduly narrowed or cast doubt upon the broad 
application of Title IX . . . and (2) legislative action is necessary to restore the prior consistent and 
long-standing and executive branch interpretation.”  Data supplied by the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Pub 
L. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988).  Although the Act did not mentioned athletics, courts have 
interpreted the act as “creating a more level playing field for female athletes.”  Cohen, 991 F.2d at 
894. 
 77. Andrew A. Ingrum, Civil Rights: Title IX and College Athletics: Is there a Viable 
Compromise, 48 OKLA. L. REV. 755, 761 (1995). 
 78. Melody Harris, Hitting ‘em Where it Hurts: Using Title IX Litigation to Bring Gender 
Equity to Athletics, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 57, 62 (1994). 
 79. See infra notes 169-83 and accompanying text. 
 80. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp 978 (D.R.I. 1992).  See also R. Lindsay Marshall, 
Cohen v. Brown University: The First Circuit Breaks New Ground Regarding Title IX’s Application 
to Intercollegiate Athletics, 28 GA. L. REV. 837, 845 (1994); LYNDON B. JOHNSON SCHOOL OF 
PUBLIC AFFAIRS, GENDER EQUITY IN INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS: THE INADEQUACY OF TITLE 
IX ENFORCEMENT BY THE U.S. OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS 9 (1993) (stating that manual lacked input 
from persons actively involved in groups promoting gender equity). 
 81. VALERIE M. BONNETTE  & LAMAR DANIEL, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., TITLE IX ATHLETICS 
INVESTIGATORS MANUAL 23-24 (1990). 
 82. Diane Heckman, Women & Athletics: A Twenty Year Retrospective on Title IX, 9 U. 
MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 1, 16 n.64 (1992).  The most prevalent example is the word 
“second-class status” used in the 1990 Manual where the word equivalence is used in the Policy 
Interpretation.  Id.  Another example of an inconsistency is the failure to include the interviewing of 
non-athletes in the 1990 Manual.  Id. 
 83. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).  Female plaintiff sued for alleged 
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Court’s holding permitted aggrieved individuals to “skip” the standard 
administrative procedures84 and proceed with an implied private right of 
action.85  However, as the dissent correctly argues, it is improper for a 
Federal court to imply a right of action and extend its jurisdiction when 
Congress intended not to provide for one.86 
A second Supreme Court case that strengthened the bite of Title IX 
was Franklin v. Gwinett County Public Schools.87 The Court allowed the 
plaintiffs to recover monetary damages upon a finding of an intentional 
violation of Title IX.88 
                                                          
sex discrimination because of her failure to be accepted into medical school.  Id.  She also claimed 
that this program was a recipient of federal aid at the time of her rejection.  Id.  The District Court 
dismissed the complaint because Title IX did not expressly authorize a private right of action.  Id.  
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the District Court.  Id. 
 84. Education, 34 C.F.R. § 110.30-.31 (2000).  Section 110.30 allows the Education 
Department (ED) to conduct “compliance reviews” and § 110.31 permits a “person . . . to file a 
complaint with the ED alleging discrimination prohibited by the Act.”  34 C.F.R. § 110.30. 
 85. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 689-709.  The Cannon Court analyzed the four-part test used in Cort 
v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1974).  The four factors are: (1) whether the statute was enacted for the benefit 
of a special class of which the plaintiff is a member, (2) the legislative history of the statute. (3) 
whether or not the private remedy being implied from the statute will frustrate the statute’s original 
intent, and (4) whether implying a remedy is “inappropriate because the subject matter involves an 
area basically of concern to the States.”  Id. at 689, 694, 703, 708.  See generally Robert H. Hunt, 
Implementation and Modification of Title IX Standards: The Evolution of Athletics Policy, 1999 
BYU EDUC. & L.J. 51, 68 (1999). 
 86. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 731-32 (Powell, J., dissenting).  Justice White, in his dissent stated: 
Rather, the legislative history, like the terms of Title VI itself, makes it abundantly clear that the Act 
was and is mandate to federal agencies to eliminate discrimination in federally funded programs.  
Although there was no intention to cut back on private remedies existing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to 
challenge discrimination occurring under color of state law, there is no basis for concluding that 
Congress contemplated the creation of private remedies either against private parties who 
previously had been subject to no constitutional or statutory obligation not to discriminate, or 
against federal officials or agencies involved in funding allegedly discriminatory program.  The 
Court argues that because funding termination, authorized by . . . 42 U.S.C. § 2000f-1, is a drastic 
remedy, Congress must have contemplated private suits in order to directly and less intrusively to 
terminate the discrimination allegedly being practiced by the recipient institutions. 
Id. at 719. 
 87. Franklin v. Gwinett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992).  Plaintiff sued the school 
district for alleged sexual harassment by a teacher.  Id.  The alleged harassment included sexual 
conversations and questions into her sexual experiences, not only with her boyfriend, but with an 
older man.  Id. at 63.  The teacher, Andrew Hill, resigned upon the condition that any investigation 
into the matter cease.  Id. at 60.  The School investigated earlier complaints but did nothing to 
prevent future occurrences.  Id. at 63.  The Court held that the equitable remedy of prospective relief 
was inadequate in this case and awarded monetary damages to the student.  Id. at 60. 
 88. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 60.  The premise of this holding was that all remedies are 
permissible “unless Congress has expressly indicated otherwise.”  Id. at 66.  The Court also held 
“that a statute does not authorize the remedy at issue in so many words is no more significant than 
the fact that it does not in terms authorize execution to [an] issue on a judgment.”  Id. at 68 (quoting 
Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 288 (1940)).  See also VARGYAS, supra note 
14
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B.  Recent Title IX Cases 
1.  Women as Plaintiffs89 
a.  Cohen v. Brown University90 
Cohen, looked upon by many as the landmark case of Title IX, 
construed the Effective Accommodation section in the manner it is 
applied today.91  Cohen was a class action suit against Brown University 
for violating Title IX.92  Members of the women’s volleyball and 
gymnastics teams sued because the University demoted their teams to 
intercollegiate club status.93 
Cohen’s primary argument focused upon the “interest and abilities” 
factor found in the regulations, and therefore argued that the three-part 
                                                          
19, at 32.  What this decision did is to place extreme fear in the minds of institutions and to require a 
quicker compliance with Title IX.  Brake, supra note 19, at 60-61.  The authors also note that a 
plaintiff’s claim does not become moot even upon graduation.  Id. at 61. 
 89. When Title IX is discussed, several cases automatically come to mind.  These cases are 
Cohen v. Brown Univ.,
 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992) (Cohen I), aff’d 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993) 
(Cohen II), aff’d on remand, 879 F. Supp. 185 (D.R.I. 1995) (Cohen III), aff’d 101 F.3d 155 (1st 
Cir. 1996) (Cohen IV), Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507 (D. Colo. 1993), aff’d in 
part and rev’d in part, 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1004 (1993) and Favia 
v. Indiana Univ. of Pennsylvania, 812 F. Supp. 578 (W.D. Pa. 1993), aff’d 7 F.3d 332 (3rd Cir. 
1993). 
 90. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992) (Cohen I), aff’d 991 F.2d 888 (1st 
Cir. 1993) (Cohen II), aff’d on remand, 879 F. Supp. 185 (D.R.I. 1995) (Cohen III), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part by
 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996) (Cohen IV). 
 91. Hunt, supra note 85, at 70; Thomas E. Evans, Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics: 
Primer on Current Legal Issues, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 55 (1996).  Cohen is held as most 
responsible for using the overall student enrollment as an indispensable factor in a Title IX 
investigation.  Earl C. Dudley, Jr., & George Rutherglen, Ironies, Inconsistencies, And 
Intercollegiate Athletics: Title IX, Title VII, And Statistical Evidence Of Discrimination, 1 VA. J. 
SPORTS & L. 177, 202 (1999).  Beginning with the present case (Cohen I), the District Court of 
Rhode Island and the First Circuit rendered four decisions that established the three-part test as the 
standard for Title IX claims.  See supra note 90 (listing the decisions in the Cohen case). 
 92. Cohen I, 809 F. Supp. at 979.  The plaintiff’s class consists of “all present and future 
Brown University women students and potential students who participate, seek to participate, and/or 
are deterred from participating in intercollegiate athletics funded by Brown.”  Id. 
 93. Id. at 981.  Along with the women’s athletic teams, Brown also demoted men’s golf and 
men’s water polo.  Id.  The plaintiff’s sought injunctive relief to reinstate the women’s athletic 
teams to varsity status and to prohibit Brown from reducing the number of women’s teams in the 
future.  Id. at 980.  The requested relief would prohibit Brown from eliminating any more teams 
would apply unless the percentage of “opportunities to participate in intercollegiate athletics equals 
the percentage of women enrolled in the undergraduate program.”  Id.  During the academic year of 
1990-91 Brown provided men and women with 31 varsity teams.  Id.  Fifteen sports were available 
to females while men could participate in sixteen.  Id. 
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test should govern.94  Of the 894 athletes at Brown, 328 were women 
(36.7%) and 566 were men (63.3%).95 Although Judge Pettine correctly 
noted that the Policy Interpretation and Investigators Manual do not 
carry significant judicial weight, she incorrectly gave deference to the 
three-part test and stated that a finding of non-compliance under Title IX 
can be established by this method.96 
Judge Pettine held that Brown failed to satisfy the three-part test 
because of the substantial difference between the percentage of 
undergraduate women and the percentage of athletic opportunities 
available to them.97 She ordered the injunction, which required Brown to 
reinstate the women’s teams to varsity status.98 
On appeal, the First Circuit (Cohen II)99 affirmed the District 
Court’s ruling and held that the Policy Interpretation is entitled to 
“substantial deference,” as is the three-part test.100  Perhaps the most 
disturbing aspect of the Cohen decision is the affirmative endorsement 
                                                          
 94. Id. at 985.  See also Education, 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1) (2001). 
 95. Cohen I, 809 F. Supp. at 981.  The undergraduate population at Brown was 2951 men 
(52.4%) and 2683 (47.6%).  Id. 
 96. Id. at 988.  Judge Pettine stated that “the Policy Interpretation and the unpublished 
Investigator’s Manual do not carry the force of law or establish controlling standards for this 
Court . . . I believe the Policy Interpretation, and to a slightly lesser extent the Investigators Manual, 
are important guides in unraveling the requirements of the athletic regulation.” Id.  At first blush, 
this method looks promising; however, this decision now gives the three-part test power to establish 
a Title IX violation without looking at any other factors listed in the regulations.  Aronberg, supra 
note 28, at 774.  Judge Pettine stated “ in my opinion the three-part test is the point of departure for 
evaluating compliance under § 106.41(c)(1).” Cohen I, 809 F. Supp. at 991. 
 97. Cohen I, 809 F. Supp. at 991-93. The Court in deciding Prong I, examined the difference 
in the percentages of opportunities and undergraduate population.  Id. at 991.  For Prong II, the 
Court held that “Brown does not have a continuing practice of program expansion even though it 
can point to impressive growth in the 1970’s.”  Id.  The Court noted that since 1977 Brown has 
added only women’s track to sports available to women.  Id.  As for Prong III, the Court found “in 
denying full varsity status to women . . . Brown has not accommodated the interests and abilities of 
women . . . under existing athletic programs.”  Id.  Brown’s only defense was to show there were no 
other women who desired to compete at that level, which they could not do.  Id. at 992. 
 98. Cohen I, 809 F. Supp. at 1001 (stating that “Brown University is ordered to take the 
following actions immediately: (1) Restore women’s gymnastics and women’s volleyball to their 
former status as fully funded intercollegiate varsity teams in Brown’s intercollegiate athletic 
program.”). 
 99. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993) (Cohen II). 
 100. Id. at 896-97 (citing Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144 (1991)).  Although the Court found 
Brown in violation of Title IX, the Court stated “it seems unlikely, even in this day and age, that the 
athletic establishments of many co-educational universities reflect the gender balance of their 
student bodies.”  Id. at 898.  Although the Court had to adhere by the regulation, it held out an 
indirect token of sympathy when it stated “whether Brown’s concept might be thought more 
attractive, or whether we, if writing on a prestine page, would craft the regulation in a manner 
different than the agency, are not very important considerations.” Id. at 899. 
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of eliminating male teams as a way to meet the compliance requirements 
of Title IX.101 
Upon remand, the District Court (Cohen III) rejected Brown’s 
argument that the “three-part test” is in direct contradiction with the 
intent of Title IX.102  The Court determined that a numerical definition of 
“substantial proportionality” was not needed and concluded that an 
institution can only attain compliance if “ . . . intercollegiate athletic 
programs mirrors the student enrollment as closely as possible.”103 
Based upon common sense and logic, Brown argued that the 
number of women enrolled at the institution is an incorrect standard to 
apply Title IX.104  While obvious to many that men and women do not 
an share equal interest in athletics,105 the Court rejected this argument on 
the notion that no person could continuously keep track and summarize 
“students interests and abilities.”106 
In Cohen IV, Brown challenged the lower Court’s reliance upon 
and use of the three-part test on both statutory and constitutional 
grounds.107  Brown’s key argument was that the panel’s decision handed 
down in Cohen II did not bind this Court.108  The Court ultimately 
                                                          
 101. Id. at 898 n.15.  The opinion stated that: 
[T]itle IX does not require that a school pour ever increasing sums into its athletic department.  If a 
university prefers to take another route, it can also bring itself into compliance with the first 
benchmark of the accommodation test by subtraction and downgrading, that is, by reducing 
opportunities for the over represented gender while keeping opportunities stable for the 
unrepresented gender (or reducing them to a much lesser extent). 
Id. 
 102. Cohen v. brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. 185, 199 (D.R.I. 1995) (Cohen III). 
 103. Id. at 202. 
 104. Id. at 204-05. Brown’s argument would have the court examine the proportionality 
between the opportunities available and those students who evince an interest and ability to 
participate in intercollegiate athletics.  Id. 
 105. See infra note 208 and accompanying text (talking about the percentage of male and 
female participants in interscholastic competition). 
 106. Cohen III, 879 F. Supp. at 205-06.  The court acknowledged that: 
given the difficulty of measuring the relative interests of men and women, it would be almost 
impossible for an institution to remain in compliance with Title IX by staying abreast of the ever-
changing relative “interests” of its male and female students and adjusting its programs accordingly. 
Because defendants’ interpretation would require substantial proportionality between the gender 
balance of its athletic program . . . and the gender balance of interested prospective student-athletes, 
constant rebalance would be necessary to maintain compliance . . . . 
Id. at 206 n.44.  The court ordered Brown to submit a complete compliance plan for the university 
within 120 days.  Id. at 211-12. 
 107. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996) (Cohen IV).  See infra notes 108-13 
and accompanying text. 
 108. Cohen IV, 101 F.3d at 162.  Id. at 162.  The court stated “in the first appeal, a panel of this 
court elucidated the applicable legal framework, upholding the substance of the district court’s 
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followed the rulings handed down in Cohen II.109 
As in the previous cases, the majority gave the Policy Interpretation 
great deference.110  The Court also rejected Brown’s arguments dealing 
with the interest of male and female students111 and their Equal 
Protection challenge to Title IX’s statutory scheme.112  However, Chief 
Justice Torruella vehemently disagreed and crucified the majority for not 
abiding by the applicable law present at the time of appeal.113 
b.  Roberts v. Colorado State University (CSU)114 
In 1992, CSU dropped its women’s varsity softball team.115  The 
plaintiffs claimed that the decision to terminate the team violated Title 
IX because there was no effective accommodation of the interests and 
abilities of the unrepresented sex.116  CSU argued that it did not violate 
Title IX because it also eliminated the men’s baseball team and by doing 
                                                          
interpretation and applicability of the law in granting plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, 
and rejecting essentially the same legal arguments Brown makes here.”  Id. 
 109. Id. at 169.  The court made clear that the rule of law handed down in Cohen II is the law 
that applied to the present case.  Id.  It also noted “nothing in the record subsequently developed at 
trial constitutes substantially different evidence that might undermine . . . rulings of law.”  Id.  
Finally, the court found that Brown failed to show any substantive reason to disregard the rulings in 
Cohen
 II.  Cohen IV, 101 F.3d at 169. 
 110. Id. at 171-72.  The Court acknowledged that the construction given to the Interpretation 
came from the original enforcing agency.  Id.  See also Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding that if Congress gave an agency power to create provisions 
of a statute, the resulting regulations are given controlling weight unless contrary to statute). 
 111. Cohen IV, 101 F.3d at 174.  The court stated that under Cohen II, the institution must 
provide full and effective accommodation.  Id. 
 112. Id. at 181-85.  Brown argued that the interpretation of the regulations require the 
imposition of quotas and preferential treatment.  Id.  Brown also argued that the court disregarded 
the applicable law in Adarand Constructors.  Id. at 183. 
 113. Id. at 188-91.  Chief Justice Torruella relied upon both Adarand and Virginia as the 
applicable law at the time of the decision.  See infra notes 216-31 and accompanying text (arguing 
that the level of scrutiny that the majority in Cohen applied was too lenient and the result was the 
incorrect application of Equal Protection law). 
 114. Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507 (D. Colo. 1993), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part sub nom by
 Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993). 
 115. Id. at 1509.  The plaintiffs sought to reinstate the softball team and prayed for damages.  
Id. 
 116. Id. at 1511-12.  In 1991-92, there were seventeen varsity teams at the institution.  Id. at 
1512.  The year in which the plaintiffs filed the claim women athletes made up 37.7% of the total 
number of athletes, whereas women totaled 48.29% of the undergraduate population.  Id.  The 
plaintiffs entered evidence that showed the gap between the percentage of female athletes and the 
percentage of female undergraduates.  Id.  From 1980-81 to the present time of the case the 
percentage gaps are: 7.6%, 12.6%, 15.6%, 15%, 12.3%, 16.5%, 14.8%, 15.6%, 16.7%, 14.9%, 
12.7% and 10.6%.  Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507, 1512 (D. Colo. 1993). 
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so brought the percentage of difference closer together.117 The Court 
quickly dismissed this argument and found that CSU failed to satisfy the 
three-part test.118 
Judge Weinshienk adopted the reasoning of Cohen and determined 
that the three-part test alone can establish non-compliance.119 The Court 
relied heavily upon the finding in Cohen that the 11.6% disparity did not 
satisfy Title IX120 and held that CSU’s disparity of 10.5% was fatal to 
the University’s claim.121  CSU appealed to the 10th Circuit, but the 
Court affirmed the injunction upon the University.122 
c.  Favia v. Indiana University of Pennsylvania (IUP)123 
This action originated in response to the University’s decision to 
cut the women’s gymnastics and field hockey teams.124  In 1990-91, IUP 
had an undergrad population of 6,003 women (55.61%) and 4,790 men 
(44.39%).125  After the cutback, the number of female athletes numbered 
only 149 or 36.51% of the total number of athletes at the University.126 
The Court entered judgment for the plaintiff with respect to the 
injunction and ordered the restoration of the women’s teams back to 
                                                          
 117. Id. at 1514. 
 118. Id. at 1511-19.  The Court also noted that the average disparity between male and female 
participation during the time from 1980 to 1991 was 14.1%.  Id. at 1512.  CSU also failed to show 
any expansion for women’s athletics during the 1970’s.  Id. at 1514.  The Court relied heavily upon 
this fact and stated “the Court cannot accept defendant’s conclusion that the mere fact that CSU 
now offers women’s teams is evidence of program expansion for women.”  Id.  The Court finally 
dismissed CSU’s argument for compliance with Prong III and found that because several women 
had the desire to participate in intercollegiate softball, and because the sport was no longer offered 
at the institution, CSU failed to accommodate their interests and abilities.  Roberts v. Colorado State 
Univ. 814 F. Supp. 1507, 1517 (D. Colo. 1993). 
 119. Id. at 1511 (stating that “the Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law will be 
limited to 34 C.F.R. § 106.41”). 
 120. Cohen I, 809 F. Supp at 991. 
 121. Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1512-13. 
 122. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 833-34.  The court agreed with the district court that Roberts did not 
satisfy the three-part test.  Id.  The court did overrule the district court on the issue of burden of 
proof and held that the plaintiff’s bore this burden but that the plaintiffs in this case satisfied that 
burden.  Id. at 831-32. 
 123. Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578 (W.D. Pa. 1993), aff’d 7 F.3d. 332 (3rd 
Cir. 1993). 
 124. Id. at 580.  The school, faced with a significant budget problem, also cut men’s soccer and 
men’s tennis.  Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id.  Before the cutback, 503 students participated in which 313 were male and 190 were 
female.  Id.  After the decision to eliminate teams, the total number of athletes totaled 397 with 248 
males participating.  Id. at 580. 
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varsity status.127  The Court gave the Interpretation great deference and 
subsequently found that IUP failed to satisfy the three-part test.128 
What may be the most important point of the case is the Court’s 
denial of the “financial hardship defense.”129  The Court, quoting from 
Haffer v. Temple University,130 stated “financial concerns alone cannot 
justify gender discrimination.”131  On appeal, the Circuit Court affirmed 
the granting of the injunction against the university and the finding that 
IUP did not comply with Title IX requirements.132 
2.  Men as Plaintiffs 
What Cohen,133 Roberts,134 and Favia135 demonstrate is the success 
that women as Title IX plaintiffs have experienced throughout the 
years.136  On the other hand, no male plaintiff bringing a Title IX claim 
has been successful.137  This lack of success is due to the court’s reliance 
on the three-part test and the fact that males are the overrepresented 
gender at the majority of institutions.138  Because of Title IX and 
                                                          
 127. Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 812 F. Supp 578, 585 (N.D. Pa. 1993).  The court based the 
granting of the injunction on public policy and stated that the “public has a strong interest in the 
prevention of any violation of Constitutional rights.”  Id. 
 128. Id. at 584-85.  IUP failed Prong I because even before the cuts were made, women only 
possessed 37.7% of the athletic opportunities, whereas their undergraduate population was 55.61%.  
Id.  IUP did not satisfy Prong II as the Court noted that “you can’t replace programs with promises.”  
Id. at 585.  Finally, Prong III was not satisfied because the promise to add new teams does not 
satisfy the interest of the present students.  Id. at 584-85. 
 129. Favia, 812 F. Supp at 585. 
 130. Haffer v. Temple Univ. 678 F. Supp. 517 (E.D. Pa. 1987). 
 131. Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 585 (citing Haffer, 678 F. Supp. at 530).  C.f. Frontiero v. 
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding that saving money by using a gender based military 
regulation is not allowable). IUP had to cut back its athletic budget by $350,000.  Favia, 812 F. 
Supp. at 580. 
 132. Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d. 332, 340-45 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 133. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992) (Cohen I), aff’d 991 F.2d 888 (1st 
Cir. 1993) (Cohen II), aff’d on remand, 879 F. Supp. 185 (D.R.I. 1995) (Cohen III), aff’d 101 F.3d 
155 (1st Cir. 1996) (Cohen IV). 
 134. Roberts v. Colorado State Univ. 814 F. Supp. 1507 (D. Colo. 1993), aff’d sub nom. 
Roberts v. Colorado State Board of Agriculture, 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993). 
 135. Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 812 F. Supp. 57 (W.D. Pa. 1993), aff’d, 7 F.3d. 332 (3d Cir. 
1993). 
 136. Joseph P. Williams, Lower Pay for Women’s Coaches: Refuting Some Common 
Justifications, 21 J.C. & U.L. 643, 646 (1995) (claiming that women who bring Title IX claims have 
had almost “universal success”). 
 137. Kelley v. University of Ill., 832 F. Supp. 237 (C.D. Ill. 1993), aff’d, 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 
1994); Harper v. Illinois State Univ., 35 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (C.D. Ill. 1999); Gonyo v. Drake Univ., 
837 F. Supp. 989 (S.D. Iowa 1993). 
 138. Jurewitz, supra note 7, at 313.  See also Alexander Wolff, The Slow Track, SPORTS 
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increasing budget constraints, institutions must cut men’s teams while at 
the same time forced by courts to retain women’s teams.139 
a.  Kelley v. University of Illinois140 
In 1993, the University of Illinois determined that it would 
eliminate men’s swimming and fencing varsity teams and the men and 
women’s diving teams.141  During the 1992-1993 school year, there were 
25,846 students; 14,427 (56%) of the students were men.142  Of the 474 
athletes, 363 were male (76.58%).143  The plaintiffs, who were members 
of the now defunct men’s swimming team, claimed that the University 
violated Title IX by cutting their team while at the same time retaining 
the women’s team.144 
The Court granted judgment on the Title IX claims to the 
University because “even though the elimination of the program 
excluded them from varsity participation as individuals, the percentage 
of all men participating in the varsity program is more than substantially 
proportionate to the percentage of men represented by the undergraduate 
population.”145 
The Court also dismissed the plaintiff’s Equal Protection claim 
because attaining Title IX compliance qualified as an “important 
governmental interest” and is “substantially related” to eliminating the 
historic discrimination towards women.146  Insultingly, the Court stated 
                                                          
ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 28, 1992, at 52; Carol Herwig, Title IX: 20 Years After, a New Call for Action, 
USA TODAY, June 8, 1992, at C10. 
 139. For examples of different men’s teams being cut because of budget constraints and Title 
IX see Mark Blaudschun, The Ax Falls on Some: BU Baseball Program Getting Cut, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Apr. 12, 1995, at 37; John Maher, Out of the Running, AUSTIN-AMERICAN STATESMAN, 
Jan. 22. 1995, at A1; Jamison Hensley, Terps Cut Men’s Scholarships, BALTIMORE SUN, Dec. 19, 
1993, at 5C; Bill Jauss, NU Adds Varsity Women’s Soccer; Men’s Fencing Clubbed, CHICAGO 
TRIBUNE, Aug. 9, 1993, § 3, at 11. 
 140. Kelley v. University of Ill., 832 F. Supp. 237 (C.D. Ill. 1993). 
 141. Id. at 239-40.  The University claimed that the reason for the cutback of its sports was to 
comply with the serious budget constraints it experienced.  Id. at 240. 
 142. Id. at 240. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 239.  This claim put forth by the plaintiffs was the first of it’s kind in Title IX 
litigation.  Id. at 241. 
 145. Kelley, 832 F. Supp. at 242.  The court noted that this over representation did not change 
even after the elimination of the teams.  Id. 
 146. Id. at 242-43.  The court applied the intermediate standard of scrutiny test.  See Craig v. 
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1977).  “To withstand constitutional challenge . . . classifications by 
gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to 
achievement of those objectives.”  Craig, 429 U.S. 190 at 197. 
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that innocent victims are needed to bear the burden in an attempt to 
remedy “the effects of a historical de-emphasis on athletic opportunities 
for women.”147  The Seventh Circuit Court affirmed the decision of the 
District Court.148 
b.  Gonyo v. Drake University149 
Drake University discontinued its men’s varsity wrestling team for 
two reasons: (1) financial constraints, and (2) other schools within their 
conference eliminated their wrestling teams.150  As was the norm 
throughout America, Drake possessed an undergraduate population of 
57.2% female and 42.8% male.151  Within the spectrum of athletics, 
males comprised 60.6% of the total number of athletes, whereas the 
women made up only 39.4%.152  Gonyo’s claim focused upon a violation 
of Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause.153  Based upon the same 
reasoning as the cases before, the Court denied the plaintiff’s request for 
an injunction to reinstate the athletic program.154 
Unfortunately, these decisions show an alarming trend that will 
forever change the face of intercollegiate athletics.  Courts permit, and in 
fact endorse, team elimination as a way to comply with Title IX instead 
of focusing the efforts of the University to promote women’s athletics.155  
                                                          
 147. Kelley, 832 F. Supp at 244.  The court foreshadowed the inequitable results of Title IX 
litigation when it stated it was “not unsympathetic to the plight of the members of the men’s 
swimming team and recognized that Congress, in enacting Title IX, probably never anticipated it 
would yield such draconian results.”  Id. at 243. 
 148. Kelley v. University of Ill., 35 F.3d. 265 (7th Cir. 1994).  The court used substantially the 
same arguments, reasoning and policy as the district court did to affirm the granting of defendant’s 
motion for summary judgment.  Id. at 269-73. 
 149. Gonyo v. Drake Univ., 837 F. Supp. 989 (S.D. Iowa 1993). 
 150. Id. at 992.  The University justified its decision by explaining that the students of Drake 
showed no interest in the program, it is not a revenue producing sport, and that other schools have 
eliminated the program when faced with a similar situation.  Id. 
 151. Id. (findings relating to monetary expenditures and non-scholarships funding). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Gonyo v. Drake Univ., 837 F. Supp. 989, 990 (S.D. Iowa 1993).  Another claim made by 
the plaintiff is that the University breached a contract between the plaintiffs and the University.  Id.  
The court dismissed this claim because Drake is still honoring its scholarship commitments to the 
plaintiffs.  Id. at 994-95. 
 154. Id. at 995-96.  The court also dismissed the Equal Protection Clause violation because 
there existed no evidence that showed the University was “acting under the color of law.” Id. at 994.  
The court also took into account the public interest at stake and permitted “colleges and universities 
to chart their own course in providing athletic opportunities . . . absent a claim showing that they are 
in violation of the law.” Id. at 996. 
 155. Spitz, supra note 49, at 654.  See also Harper v. Illinois State Univ., 35 F. Supp. 2d 1118 
(C.D. Ill. 1999) (plaintiffs claiming that the elimination of intercollegiate soccer and wrestling is a 
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What the majority of courts have failed to realize is that the goal of Title 
IX is to expand and promote women’s participation, not to sound the 
death knell of men’s sports.156 
Recently, there seems to be a small flickering of light in the 
distance for male intercollegiate athletics.  At least in one case to date, 
the court has ignored the pressure and politicking from Civil Rights and 
feminist groups, and as time may tell, this trend may be the “savior” of 
intercollegiate athletics.157 
In Pederson v. Louisiana State University,158 two classes of female 
students that were interested in participating in soccer and softball sued 
to require the University to establish these teams, because failure to do 
so violates Title IX.159  While the Court ultimately ruled that LSU was in 
violation of Title IX, it did so without following the “incorrect” Cohen 
application of the three-part test.160 
                                                          
violation of Title IX).  The court held that the University could cut men’s programs without 
violating the statute because men’s interests and abilities are presumptively met when substantial 
proportionality exists.  Id. at 1122. 
 156. Dr. Christine H.B. Grant, A Basic Title IX Presentation: Title IX and Gender Equity 
(1995), available at <http://www.baliwick.lib.uiowa.edu/ge/present.html> (presenting a study on 
Title IX compiled by the University of Iowa).  The pertinent information for this article is found on 
pages 10 and 11 of the presentation.  Most notably, the severe decrease in men’s gymnastics and 
wrestling between the years of 1982-1994. 
 157. See infra notes 158-68 and accompanying text. 
 158. Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892 (M.D. La. 1996), aff’d in part & 
rev’d
 
in part, 201 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2000), reh’g granted, 213 F.3d 858 (5th Cir. 2000).  At the 
time of this suit, the undergraduate population was 51%-49% male and the athletic program was 
71%-29% male.  Id. at 915.  This decision did several novel things never seen before in Title IX 
litigation.  First, the court rejected the “substantial proportionality” prong as a “safe harbor” for 
institutions to meet for Title IX compliance.  Jurewitz, supra note 7, at 344.  Second, the court 
breathed new life into Prongs II and III of the test.  Id.  By shifting some of the focus from Prong I, 
institutions may not have the opportunity to come into compliance with Title IX by showing 
evidence of “expansion” and “full accommodation.”  Id.  While it is assumed that all three prongs 
apply, it is hard to find a court that has found compliance by using Prong II and III.  Id.  Finally, the 
court gives the institution more choices in how to serve the interests of its students by rejecting 
Cohen’s interpretation of Prong III.  Id.  In essence, the court eliminated the “full” out of Prong III.  
Id. at 344.  This decision is similar to Brown’s argument to promote “relative interests” instead of 
“full accommodation.”  Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 169-71 (1st Cir. 1996) (Cohen IV).  
Although this ground-breaking decision has not yet received the praise Cohen originally did, its 
mandates and rulings are starting to influence other courts throughout the nation.  Jurewitz, supra 
note 7, at 345.  See, e.g., Neal v. Board of Tr. of the California State Univ., 1999 WL 1569047 (E.D. 
Cal. 1999), rev’d 198 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 159. Pederson, 912 F. Supp at 897-98.  The plaintiffs claim their interests and abilities were 
not satisfied.  Id. 
 160. Id. at 914.  The Court stated that “to the extent that the Policy Interpretation suggests by 
use of the disjunctive “or” that mere reliance upon substantial numerical proportionality between the 
sexes suffices, is contrary to the explicit language in 20 U.S.C. § 1681(b) and will not be followed 
herein.”  Id. 
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Justice Rebecca F. Dougherty did not follow Cohen161 or Roberts162 
and their use of numerical percentages163 because those cases assumed 
that both men and women have the same interest and ability to 
participate in sports.164 Justice Dougherty also distinguished this court 
by not giving complete deference to the Policy Interpretation.165 
The Interpretation only provided the Court with a “helpful guide to 
a thoughtful analysis of the mandate of Title IX.”166  By correctly 
understanding the policy and intent behind Title IX, Justice Dougherty 
had the insight to foresee what will occur if future reliance is based upon 
Cohen.167  According to Justice Dougherty, application of Title IX 
would lead to “an unsupported and static determination of interest” and 
“unjust results.”168 
IV.  TITLE IX SHOULD NOT APPLY TO INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS 
A.  Congress Intended a Program-Specific Approach 
Title IX has applied to intercollegiate athletics for over twenty-five 
years.  While the positive results are nothing short of remarkable, there 
are shortcomings in its modern interpretation.  If the intent of Title IX 
were interpreted correctly, it would demonstrate that Title IX does not 
apply to athletics. 
The first reason why athletics are not within the “long-armed reach” 
of Title IX is that the history behind the conception of the statute 
                                                          
 161. See supra notes 95 and 97 (26.6% differential between male and female participation in 
athletics). 
 162. See supra note 121 (24.6% differential between male and female participation in 
athletics). 
 163. Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 913.  The Fifth Circuit at that time had not resolved or even 
addressed this highly litigated issue.  Id. 
 164. Id. at 913-14.  The court correctly noted that athletic ability and interest will invariably 
differ from each town, city and state across the Untied States.  Id. 
 165. Id. at 914.  This is because the “numerical proportionality” standard that earlier courts 
applied is not found anywhere within the language of the statute.  Id.  Justice Dougherty argues that 
this standard is loosely inferred from the Interpretation and it completely fails to recognize other 
language within the statute that the plaintiffs’ standard contradicts.  Pederson v. Louisiana State 
Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892, 914 (M.D. La 1996). 
 166. Id. 
 167. For an explanation on the future effects of the Cohen application see infra note 168 
(continuing an elimination of non-revenue men’s athletic teams), and see infra notes 214-32 and 
accompanying text (discussing the incorrect application pool and how the interpretation set forth in 
Cohen
 violates the Equal Protection Clause). 
 168. Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 913-14. 
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demands a “program-specific” approach.169  Notwithstanding the Civil 
Rights Restoration Act of 1987,170 Title IX’s “program-specific” 
approach is mirrored after the “program-specific” approach of Title 
VI.171  In fact, Congress intended Title IX to function and apply in the 
same manner as Title VI.172 
Judicial interpretation of Title VI, before the passage of Title IX, 
clears up any remaining ambiguity as to the original intent of 
Congress.173  The legislative history of Title VI shows the intention of 
Congress to limit the word “program” to those programs which directly 
receive “specific federal grants.”174 
                                                          
 169. Johnson, supra note 20, at 553 (noting that the final version of Title IX was significantly 
different that the original form that Senator Bayh proposed).  The original version included 
language that would extend Title IX to any “program or activity conducted by a public institution of 
higher education . . . which is a recipient of federal financial assistance.”  Id. at 562.  See also 117 
CONG. REC. 30, 156; Paul J. Van de Graaf, The Program Specific Reach of Title IX, 83 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1210 (1983). 
 170. 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1994). 
 171. Van de Graaf, supra note 169, at 1221-22.  42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1994), has the program 
specific language that is also found in 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994).  Id. at 1244 n.88.  The only major 
difference is that Title IX prohibits discrimination based upon sex, while Title VI prohibits 
discrimination premised upon a person’s race, origin, or color.  Id.  The Rehabilitation Act in 29 
U.S.C. § 794 (1994), is modeled on the same framework of Title VI.  Id.  Numerous courts have 
found that § 794 is program-specific.  See generally Brown v. Sibley, 650 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1981); 
Ferris v. University of Tex., 558 F. Supp. 536 (W.D. Tex. 1983). 
 172. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 526-28 (1982) (stating that the floor 
debates are the most significant indicator of what the actual intent of Congress was in respect to 
Title IX).  Although the legislative history of Title IX with respect to athletics is limited in scope, 
the available history supports the theory that the statute is not to be read in an “over-expansive” and 
broad manner.  Van de Graaf, supra note 169, at 1224-25. 
 173. Van de Graaf, supra note 169 at 1229.  See also Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 
U.S. 677, 696 (1979) (stating that the “drafters of Title IX explicitly assumed it would be interpreted 
as Title VI had been during the preceding eight years”). 
 174. Note, Title VI, Title IX, and the Private University: Defining “Recipient” and “Program 
or Part Thereof,” 78 MICH. L. REV. 608 (1980) (arguing that the change from the original version to 
the modern day version evinces the program specific interpretation because Congress eliminated the 
word “indirect”).  See also Civil Rights: Hearings Before the Subcommittee No.5 of the House 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 730 (1963) (defining program in relation to a specific 
grant).  Both the Senate floor debates and the House reports provide a comprehensive list of both 
grant statutes and the programs covered by Title IX.  Van de Graaf, supra note 169, at 1229 
(referring to Deputy Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach’s letter that was given to the Chairman 
of the House Judiciary Committee listing the specific grant statues and their programs).  Congress 
defined “program” as encompassing both the grant statute and the recipient of the grant statute.  Id. 
at 1230 (arguing that it cannot refer to the statute itself because a person cannot be excluded from a 
grant statute).  See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d), 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).  The goal of this legislation was 
to end discrimination, not at the administrative level, but at the specific recipient’s level.  110 
CONG. REC. 6544-45 (1964).  Cf. Soberal-Perez v. Schweiker, 549 F. Supp. 1164 (1982) (holding 
that Title VI is not triggered in respect to social security payments because discrimination can only 
take place at the level of administration). 
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Existing case law provides substantial credence to Congress’ true 
intent.  In 1969, the Fifth Circuit handed down its ruling in Board of 
Public Instruction v. Finch.175  The department’s main argument was 
that “program” does not refer to individual grants, but to a much broader 
category.176  The Court, however, held that this argument was misplaced, 
and to correctly effectuate the intent of Congress, the Fifth Circuit 
interpreted “program” to refer to the specific grant statute.177 
This case becomes even more important because the legislative 
history of Title IX is at best slightly ambiguous.178  The decision in 
Finch 179
 is the only judicial decision, before the enactment of Title IX, 
that defines what specifically “program” encompasses.180  While Senator 
Bayh never explicitly mentioned the Finch decision in the debates 
leading to the passage of Title IX, he did place substantial emphasis on 
the Court’s decision and stated that it reflected Congressional intent.181 
Although the modern day application of Title IX to athletics is 
unquestioned, Congress erred in passing the Civil Rights Restoration 
Act of 1987.182  Congress misinterpreted the legislative history of Title 
IX, and by doing so, overruled the decision handed down in Grove City 
                                                          
 175. Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969).  The school operated 
eight public schools where 2900 whites students and 975 black students attended.  Id. at 1070.  No 
white student was allowed to attend class with a black student and vice versa.  Id.  The school 
submitted to the HEW a plan for desegregation, but the HEW was not pleased with the pace of 
compliance.  Id. at 1070-71.  The HEW ruled that the school was no longer entitled to federal funds.  
Id. 
 176. Id. at 1076.  The HEW argued that “program” meant “not an individual grant statute, but 
to such general categories such as road programs or school programs.”  Board of Pub. Instruction v. 
Finch, 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969). 
 177. Id. at 1077-78.  The court relied heavily upon the intended purpose and the legislative 
history of Title VI to render its decision.  Id.  The Court stated “termination shall be limited in its 
effect to the particular program, or part thereof, in which such noncompliance has been so found.”  
Id. at 1076.  See generally Kuhn, supra note 49.  The court also found the discussions within the 
Congressional debates dispositive.  Finch, 414 F.2d at 1077.  Reference was made to individual 
programs, not broad based categories (referring to farm-to-market road program, vocational 
agricultural teaching).  Id. 
 178. Comment, HEW’s Regulation Under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972: 
Ultra Vires Challenges, 1976 BYU L. REV. 133 (1976). 
 179. Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969). 
 180. Van de Graaf, supra note 169, at 1230-31 (noting that no other court had the opportunity 
to decide what exactly program actually meant). 
 181. Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Post Secondary 
Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 184 (1975). 
 182. By passing the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Congress blatantly disregarded a 
Supreme Court case, several Appellate and District Court cases, and the original intent of Title IX 
as evidenced by reference to Title VI.  For a more thorough discussion of the above listed factors 
see supra notes 68-72, 169-81. 
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College.183  While it is not likely that Title IX’s application to athletics 
will subside in the near future, its application relies upon misconstrued 
interpretations. 
B.  Athletics Have No Place In Civil Rights Legislation 
The history of Title IX shows that it is included under the general 
definition of Civil Rights Legislation, as it came in part from the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and gained “teeth” under the Civil Rights 
Restoration Act of 1987.184  Civil Rights have long been a cornerstone 
for the advancement and ethical treatment of minorities in our 
country.185 
Although this country continues to view women as a minority, 
courts can no longer maintain this view.186  Women constitute a majority 
of the general population and a majority of the undergraduate enrollment 
at institutions.187  It is hard to conceive that sports could be part of Civil 
Rights legislation.  Sports are a “past time” and do not hold the same 
level of importance as do the issues of employment, health care, and 
                                                          
 183. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.  The court in Grove City College held that 
Title IX used a “program-specific” approach in dealing with Title IX and its violations.  See supra 
note 71. 
 184. Darryl C. Wilson, Parity Bowl IX: Barrier Breakers v. Common Sense Makers: The 
Serpentine Struggle for Gender Diversity in Collegiate Athletics, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 397, 419 (1996-
97).  The author refers to Theodore Greenberg and his work CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION which 
discusses several examples of Civil Rights legislation.  Id. at 441 n.83 (citing THEODORE 
GREENBERG, CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION (3d. ed. 1991)).  The accepted definition of Civil Rights 
(civil liberties) is “personal [or] natural rights guaranteed and protected by [the] Constitution; e.g., 
freedom of speech, press . . . .  Body of law dealing with natural liberties, shorn of excesses which 
invade equal rights of others.  Constitutionally, they are restraints on the government. . . .  State law 
may recognize liberty interests more extensive . . . .”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 168 (6th ed. 
1991).  See also Wilson, at 419 n.84 (pointing out that the Civil Rights Restoration Act also dealt 
with much more than intercollegiate athletics).  It promoted the application of Title IX, Title VI, the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Rehabilitation Act.  Id. at 419. 
 185. Compare Wilson, supra note 184, at 420 n.89 (stating that Civil Rights primary focus is 
on the African-American population and more specifically affirmative action), with Leroy D. Clark, 
New Directions for the Civil Rights Movement: College Athletics as a Civil Rights Issue, 36 
HOWARD L.J. 259 (1993) (arguing that sports fall under the umbrella coverage of Civil Rights). 
 186. See infra note 187 and accompanying text. 
 187. In 2000, women averaged 54.9% of the undergraduate population, whereas men 
composed 45.1% of the undergraduate population.  Wesley R. Habley, First Year Students: The 
Year 2000, available at <http://www.artsci.ccsu/edu/Planning/Students2000.html>.  Cf., Frontiero 
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 n.17 (1973) (stating “women do not constitute a small and 
powerless minority”).  For an opposing view to the thought that women are no longer a minority 
see, e.g., Connie Chang, Immigrants Under the New Welfare Law: A Call for Uniformity, A Call for 
Justice, 45 UCLA L. REV. 205, 276 n.268 (1997), including women and minorities within the 
gamut of “politically powerless segments of society. 
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housing.188 
What arises from the use of Title IX, as a piece of Civil Rights 
legislation, is exactly what Civil Rights in general seeks to prohibit.189  
The “majority (women)” claim protection under the statue, which in turn 
hinder the “minority,” who should be protected by Civil Rights 
legislation.190 
The sports that typically cause a Title IX violation at an institution 
are football, basketball, and sometimes track.191  Caucasian women file 
the majority of the Title IX claims in the courts.192  The addition of 
women’s athletic teams usally involves sports not played by inner city 
children, and more specifically African-Americans.193 
To allow Civil Rights legislation to apply to intercollegiate athletics 
will shackle the advancement of the minority in favor of the “majority.”  
In reality, it sets back decades of progress made by those who 
continuously benefit from “true Civil Rights” legislation.194 
                                                          
 188. NEIL D. ISAACS, JOCK CULTURE USA 22 (1978) (realizing that sport’s role in society is 
one of leisure).  See also Allen Guttman, From Ritual to Record, in THE NATURE OF MODERN 
SPORTS (1978) (explaining how the role of athletics has changed significantly over time). 
 189. Leti Volpp, Righting Wrongs, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1815, 1833 (2000) (arguing that the goal 
of civil rights is to protect the powerless and bring about equality to all the citizens of the United 
States).  See also Gerald S. Janoff, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena: The Supreme Court to 
Decide the Fate of Affirmative Action, 69 TULANE L. REV. 997, 1010 (1995) (arguing that if 
equality is desired we need more than “formal equality” as we must strive for “equal opportunity”). 
 190. Wilson, supra note 184, at 421-22.  See also supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
 191. Clark, supra note 185, at 267 (using statistics and reports to show that more than seventy 
percent of all basketball players, fifty percent of football players and a majority of the participants in 
track and field are African-American); Wilson, supra note 183, at 422 n.98. 
 192. Wilson, supra note 184, at 422. 
 193. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp 978 (D.R.I. 1992) (bringing claim for gymnastics and 
volleyball teams); Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507 (D. Colo. 1993) (bringing a 
claim for women’s softball team); Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pennsylvania, 812 F. Supp. 578 (W.D. 
Pa. 1993) (claim for gymnastics and field hockey teams); Pederson v. Louisiana St. Univ., 912 F. 
Supp. 892 (M.D. La. 1996) (bringing claim for softball and soccer teams), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part, 201 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2000), reh’g granted, 213 F.3d 858 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 194. See, e.g., Justice Clarence Thomas, Personal Responsibility, 12 REGENTS U. L. REV. 313 
(1999-2000).  Civil Rights legislation opened up “doors” that were shut to minorities, specifically 
African-Americans.  Marvin Lazerson, The Disappointments of Success: Higher Education After 
World War II, 559 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 64, 71 (1998). 
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V.  ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE TO INCREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
TITLE IX WITHOUT CUTTING MEN’S ATHLETIC TEAMS 
A.  Cohen Requires Affirmative Action/Application of the Qualified 
Applicant Pool 
Since the passage of Title IX twenty-eight years ago, there has been 
no other issue as widely debated among judges, commentators, and those 
directly involved in athletics than the interpretation that Cohen gave to 
the Effective Accommodation Test.195 The suggestions listed below do 
not encapsulate an exhaustive list.196  While disadvantages may 
accompany each alternative listed, they provide benefits to everyone 
involved. 
The first and perhaps most important alternative to the modern day 
application of Title IX is for the courts to eliminate the Cohen 
interpretation.  Cohen formulated the basic interpretation of Title IX.197  
The Court decided the case by examining only the “Effective 
Accommodation” provision and disregarding the other nine factors that 
the courts may use in consideration of the final judgment.198 
                                                          
 195. See Brian L. Porto, Title IX, Gender Equity, and the Future of College Sports, 25-MAR. 
VT. B.J. & L. DIG. 37, 37 (1999) (arguing there is substantial controversy over the reliance on the 
Effective Accommodation test as the “test” for Title IX compliance). 
 196. For additional ideas to reform Title IX to meet its original intent see ACHIEVING GENDER 
EQUITY, supra note 58, at V1-V13.  An option that deals directly with the day-to-day operations of 
the athletic department is the correction of fund mismanagement and the establishment of specific 
accounting procedures that will determine exactly where the money is going. Connolly, supra note 
22, at 929.  In practice, the department should make sure that their records reflect what is spent on 
men’s sports and what is spent on women’s sports.  Id.  See also Mike McGraw, et al., Money 
Games Inside the NCAA: Revenues
 
Dominate College Sports World, KANSAS CITY STAR, Oct. 5, 
1997, at A1.  Institutions repeatedly over spend in certain sports and while this faux pas may allow 
that sport greater success, it negatively influences the chances of meeting any Title IX requirement.  
Id.  While revenue has increased substantially over the past years the majority of the time it that 
revenue is given back to the sport that produced it originally.  Id.  Studies have shown that “for 
every dollar in revenue earned by sports like football and basketball, only five cents is spent on non-
revenue sports.”  Mark Hammond, Substantial Proportionality Not Required: Achieving Title IX 
Compliance Without Reducing Participation in Collegiate Athletics, 87 KY. L.J. 793, 811 (1999).  
While this type of “ludicrous” spending will please the donors, alumni, and the students in the short 
run, it will hamper and possibly prevent colleges and universities from obtaining Title IX 
compliance in the foreseeable future.  Id. 
 197. Cohen II, 991 F.2d at 897 (holding that an “institution that offers women a smaller 
number of athletic opportunities than the statute requires may not rectify that violation simply by 
lavishing more resources on those women or achieving equivalence in other respects”). 
 198. Cohen III, 879 F. Supp. at 200 (focusing upon the first of ten factors listed at 34 C.F.R. § 
106.41(c)(1)).  See supra note 56. It was of no concern to the court whether the University 
accomplished this goal by satisfying prong one, two or three (stating that if Brown University fails 
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By using the substantial proportionality method, the Court found 
that Brown University retained an improper disparity between male and 
female athletes.199  In essence, the Cohen Court requires an institution to 




While incorrectly placing significant importance on the first prong, 
the Court in Cohen went on to interpret the “substantial proportionality” 
language as requiring “gender balance of an institution’s athletic 
program to substantially mirror the gender balance of its student 
enrollment.”201  The proportionality test erroneously assumes that the 
percentage of men and women who are interested in intercollegiate 
athletics is equal to the percentage of men and women enrolled at the 
particular institution.202 
Senator Bayh (D-Ind.) was extremely concerned that future judges 
and legislators would interpret the statute to require affirmative action.203  
Section 1681(b) is concrete evidence of the distaste for the application of 
quotas.204  This section of Title IX also follows the “blueprint” of Title 
VII.205  During the Senate debates of 1964, Senator Clark and Senator 
Case presented a memorandum interpreting Title VII.206  Courts interpret 
                                                          
the first two tests, or does not try to comply with these tests . . . it must comply with the third 
benchmark).  Id. 
 199. Cohen III, 879 F. Supp. at 201-02. 
 200. Cohen II, 991 F.2d at 906 (requiring Brown University to “fully and effectively 
accommodate the underrepresented gender. . .even if that requires it to give to the under 
represented gender . . . what amounts to a larger slice of a shrinking athletic-opportunity pie”) 
(emphasis added). 
 201. Cohen III, 879 F. Supp. at 200.  See also supra notes 90-110. 
 202. George A. Davidson & Carla A. Kerr, Title IX: What is Gender Equity?, 2 VILL. SPORTS 
AND ENT. L.J. 25, 29-30 (1995).  Now institutions will create athletic opportunities with no 
assurance that the women who fill the spots will have the ability or the interest to compete at such a 
high level of competition.  Leahy, supra note 7, at 529.  Leahy also raises the concern that the 
creation of spots by addition and subtraction is arbitrary because “there is no basis” from which to 
establish actual student interest and ability.  Id.  This interpretation of the statute unfortunately leads 
to the creation of a quota system and produces affirmative action.  Mahoney, supra note 27, at 944.  
Mahoney argues that because opportunities are created based on gender, Title IX has become a 
statue that requires “sex-based discrimination.” Id. 
 203. 117 CONG. REC. 30,406-07 (1971). 
 204. See supra notes 25-27 (discussing statements showing extreme dislike for the use of 
quotas in the legislation). 
 205. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1994).  Judicial decisions that have involved Title VII and the 
issue of preferential treatment based upon a single characteristic have established a strong 
prohibition against quotas.  See, e.g., West Virginia Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991). 
 206. 110 CONG. REC. 7212 (1964).  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (stating that “nothing contained 
in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer . . . to grant preferential treatment to 
any individual or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex or national origin of such 
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42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(j) as not requiring an employer to “adopt quotas or 
preferences simply because of a racial imbalance.”207  The law does not 
require an institution to make the athletic program “mirror the general 
population of that school.”208 
While discrimination may be one of the causes of low female 
participation at the interscholastic level, it is unfathomable to require 
intercollegiate institutions to provide 54.9% of athletic spots when only 
40.8% of athletes in high school are women.209 The proper inquiry to 
determine if a school complies with the mandates of Title IX is a 
comparison to the “qualified applicant pool.”210 
This pool is the number of male and females that have the ability 
and the desire to participate in intercollegiate sports and the number of 
male and female athletes at the institution.211 Common sense should 
inform people that not all students have the ability to become involved in 
athletics and it is highly unlikely that people not participating in 
interscholastic sports will be able to compete intercollegiately.212 
By focusing upon the willing and able participants that enroll at an 
institution, instead of comparing the number of athletes to the total 
number of undergraduates of the unrepresented sex, both the courts and 
the schools benefit by applying a legally correct analysis and a greater 
statistical opportunity to achieve compliance under a Title IX inquiry.213 
                                                          
individual . . . .”). 
 207. Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n v. E.E.O.C., 478 U.S. 421, 463 (1986). 
 208. Cf.  International Bros. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339-40 n.20 (1977) 
(stating that Title VII does not mandate the work force to “mirror the general population”). 
 209. In 1999, there were 6,504,298 participants in high school athletics.  Bruce Howard & John 
Gillis, High School Athletics Participation Reaches All-Time High available at 
<http://www.nfhs.org/topstories.htm#participation> (released Sept. 14, 1999).  Women accounted 
for 2,652,796 of those participants.  Id.  In 2000, women averaged 54.9% of the undergraduate 
population.  Habley, supra note 185, at 3. 
 210. See infra note 210-12 and accompanying text. 
 211. Beveridge, supra note 11, at 831.  The analysis behind this inquiry comes logically from 
two Supreme Court cases.  Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (rejecting in 
theory the substantial proportionality test to one that takes into account the most important 
qualification: ability to participate); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977) 
(taking into account the ability of teachers in the St. Louis area). 
 212. Leahy, supra note 6, at 532, n.239 (showing that some people have the ability to compete 
in sports either do not have sports at their high schools or enroll in “private academies”). 
 213. Id.  But see Felice M. Duffy, Twenty-Seven Years Post Title IX: Why Gender Equity in 
College Athletics Does not Exist, 19 QLR 67, 82-94 (2000) (arguing that if the opportunities were 
available, women would take part in athletics at a greater rate than at the present time). 
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B.  Cohen’s Application of the Three Part Test is Invalid under the 
Equal Protection Clause 
The United States Supreme Court has held that there is a 
constitutional requirement that “no person shall be treated differently by 
others” because of gender.214  It is unfortunate that the victory claimed 
by women under Title IX has been “achieved by sacrificing 
Constitutional value.”215  The question confronting institutions that 
provide athletic programs is whether it can comply with the decision in 
Cohen
 and not violate the Equal Protection Clause in the process.216 
The lawyers for Brown University argued that the accommodation 
of the unrepresented gender, women, disadvantaged male athletes, and 
therefore violated the Equal Protection Clause found in the Fifth 
Amendment.217  The Court ultimately rejected this argument, and in fact, 
every court confronted with this Equal Protection Claim brought by 
“disadvantaged” male athletes has emphatically rejected the argument.218 
Between the decision in Cohen II and Cohen IV, the Supreme Court 
ruled on the Virginia and Adarand Constructors (Adarand) cases.219  
When arguments for Cohen IV 220 took place, Brown argued that both 
Virginia
 and Adarand made the District Court’s ruling in Cohen in direct 
contradiction with the present law.221  However, the Court determined 
                                                          
 214. See infra notes 219-32 and accompanying text (examining in greater depth the holdings 
and reasoning behind the Court’s decision in each case). 
 215. William E. Thro & Brian A. Snow, The Conflict Between the Equal Protection Clause 
and Cohen v. Brown University, 123 ED. LAW. REP. 1013, 1016 (1998).  The constitutional value 
that is sacrificed is the right given to people that no one can be treated differently just because of 
their gender.  Id.  See also infra notes 239-50. 
 216. Thro, supra note 215, at 1016.  The Equal Protection Clause is only applicable to public 
institutions.  Id. at n.8.  Unfortunately, this is legally impossible.  See infra notes 223-32 and 
accompanying text. 
 217. Id. at 1018.  While the text of the Constitution says nothing about the Equal Protection 
Clause in the Fifth Amendment, its interpretation mandates the same restrictions on the federal 
government as the Fourteenth Amendment does upon the individual states.  U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV (equal protection as applicable to the states); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (applying 
the Due Process clause of the 5th Amendment to guarantee the equal protection of the laws). 
 218. See, e.g., Brian A. Snow & Stephanie Clemente, Wrestling with Title IX, 145 ED. LAW 
REP. 1, 20 (2000).  The authors state that although courts have rejected the Equal Protection Claims, 
many commentators and scholars have infact disagreed with the Cohen decisions.  Id. at 20 n.55. 
 219. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pena, 515 
U.S. 200 (1995).  Cohen II was decided in 1993 and the First Circuit’s affirmance was early in 
1996. 
 220. Cohen v. Brown Univ. 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1186 (1997). 
 221. Thro, supra note 215, at 1021.  Brown University argued four points: (1) The 
interpretation that the district court put on the three-part test resulted in Title IX applying as an 
affirmative action statute; (2) the court should follow the “new” law found in Adarand and Virginia 
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that neither Virginia nor Adarand had any substantive effect on the 
earlier decisions given in Cohen, and quickly dismissed the argument.222  
This Court obviously failed to give Virginia and Adarand their 
appropriate due as the ruling in Cohen IV violates the Equal Protection 
Clause.223 
Properly passed legislation is presumed to be valid and will usually 
be sustained if the classification drawn is rationally related to a 
legitimate governmental interest.224  Although this general rule applies in 
the majority of situations, the Court applies a heightened standard of 
scrutiny if the statute involves a “suspect or quasi suspect” 
classification.225 
The Court in Adarand, although not explicitly deciding on the 
standard of scrutiny in respect to gender, determined that the standard 
for all race-based classifications, even benign ones, should be based 
upon strict scrutiny.226  Before the Virginia case, all gender 
classifications were “quasi suspect.”227 
Virginia
 heightened the standard for gender classifications, 
                                                          
and disregard the law handed down in the earlier decisions of Cohen, (3) the standards of Title VII 
should apply to the present case, and (4) the district court was in error by requiring Brown 
University to follow a stated course of compliance.  Id.  See also Cohen IV, 101 F.3d at 185 
(explaining the reasoning behind the court’s decision to reject Brown’s arguments). 
 222. Thro, supra note 215, at 1022.  Cohen IV, 101 F.3d at 183 (stating that Virginia “adds 
nothing to the analysis of equal protection challenges to gender-based classifications” because it did 
not deal with the present issue). 
 223. The basic notion expressed by the Equal Protection Clause is that its protection 
encompasses persons.  Id. at 1029 n.101 (listing numerous cases that lend direct support and several 
that provide inferential support).  Equal Protection also requires that all persons situated in a similar 
position must be treated alike.  City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).  
The similar situation at issue is the men and women who are denied the right to participate in 
intercollegiate athletics. 
 224. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.  See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 
411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973). 
 225. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. 
 226. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 225-29.  The Court held that courts should be precluded from 
lowering their standards of scrutiny for benign classifications.  Id.  The rule only works correctly 
when the courts admit an “individual suffers an injury when he or she is disadvantaged by the 
government because of his or her race, whatever that race may be.” Id. at 230. 
 227. See generally Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (stating 
that the classification is upheld if it (1) serves an important governmental objective and (2) is 
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 
(1976).  Using this standard, many courts have upheld statutes that give one gender an advantage in 
response to the historic and inequitable discrimination levied upon them by society.  See, e.g., 
Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (allowing women under the Social Security Act to 
eliminate low earning years from calculation of retirement benefits because historically they have 
never been able to earn as men). 
33
Reuscher: Giving the Bat Back to Casey
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2002
REUSCHER1.DOC 1/2/02  1:34 PM 
150 AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:1 
 
upholding gender classifications only if (1) an exceedingly persuasive 
justification for the classification exists, (2) the classification served an 
important governmental objective, and (3) the classification is 
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.228 In his 
dissent, Justice Scalia noted that the “exceedingly persuasive 
justification” standard was indistinguishable from “strict scrutiny.”229 
It appears from the Court’s ruling that the exceedingly persuasive 
justification is interchangeable with “compelling state interest” required 
for race classifications.230  Under this analysis, the reasoning of Cohen 
and its application of the three-part test would surely fail.231  The only 
time a court may examine a Title IX claim under the Cohen analysis is 
where there is a showing of intentional discrimination; however, the fact 
that a gender is unrepresented at an institution, after using the “correct 
applicant pool,” is not intentional discrimination and has been dismissed 
accordingly in court.232 
Because the three-part test and the substantial proportionality 
interpretation are contrary to Equal Protection principles, neither retains 
credence in a court of law.  Congress should develop a new standard to 
achieve a more precise application of Title IX’s original intent. 
 
                                                          
 228. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).  This standard will apply regardless 
of what gender is favored by statute and regardless if it is to rectify historical discrimination.  Thro, 
supra
 note 215, at n.115 (listing of cases that support proposition); See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for 
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 718 (1981). 
 229. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 596 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 230. Thro, supra note 215, at 1032.  The author made the analogy by stating: 
Thus, if something is a compelling state interest for purposes of a racial classification, it also would 
be regarded as an exceedingly persuasive justification for purposes of a gender classification.  
Conversely, if something were not a compelling state interest for purposes of a racial classification, 
it generally would not be regarded as an exceedingly persuasive justification for purposes of a 
gender classification. 
Id.  The only compelling state interest to date is the need to remedy historical intentional 
discrimination by the government.  Id. at n.123. 
 231. Jurewitz, supra note 7, at 330-31.  Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F. 3d 155, 188-192 (1st 
Cir. 1996) (Cohen IV) (Torruella, C.J., dissenting) (explaining that the majority did not apply the 
“exceedingly persuasive justification” correctly in the case).  Chief Justice Torruella wanted to 
subject “benign” governmental actions to the same standard of scrutiny as any other gender 
classifications.  Id. at 190.  Because Virginia and Adarand were decided between Cohen appeals, 
the court must now subject the classification to the “exceedingly persuasive justification” test, 
which the majority failed to accomplish.  Id. at 191. 
 232. 3 RONALD R. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 18.4 
(2 ed. 1992) (stating that statistical proof of impact on racial groups is not enough to establish a 
racial classification). 
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C.  Certain Sports Should Be Classified As Profit Centers/Business 
Ventures 
While it is beneficial to the “American spirit” that people create a 
connection between athletics and higher education, most athletic 
departments function separately from the institution.233 In reality, the 
purpose of athletics is not to provide lifelong skills for the student, but to 
operate as a “profit center” for the institution.234  The major premise 
behind this alternative is that an institution may designate those sports 
that produce revenue as “businesses” and those that do not produce 
revenue as “amateur.”235 
This distinction would give the university a more realistic chance of 
coming into compliance with Title IX.  Sports that fall under the label of 
“businesses” would be exempt from calculations in determining whether 
a violation of Title IX exists.236  The athletes participating on these 
teams are employees rather than students (athlete-students instead of 
student-athletes).237 In fact, studies show that students who participate in 
“major sports” view themselves as employees of the institution rather 
than an enrolled student playing sports, and are therefore entitled to the 
benefits that come with being an employee, specifically wages.238 
                                                          
 233. B. Glenn George, Who Plays and Who Pays: Defining Equality in Intercollegiate 
Athletics, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 647, 663-64; But see 1997-98 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, art. 2, § 
2.9 (stating the NCAA seeks to maintain amateurism and promote a relation between education and 
athletics). 
 234. Daniel, supra note 5, at 292.  See also Ernest L. Boyer, Foreword, in THE RULES OF THE 
GAME ix, xi (Richard E. Lapchick & John B. Slaughter eds., 1989) (saying “Big Time Sport, 
collegiate and professional, is becoming the new civil authority in our culture.  It draws . . . pride 
and unifies the community in the same ways the great cathedrals did in earlier times.”); Stephen M. 
Schott, Give Them What They Deserve: Compensating the Student-Athlete for Participation in 
Intercollegiate Athletics, 3 SPORTS L.J. 25, 26 (1996) (claiming that two-thirds of all professional 
basketball and football players never receive their college degree).  But see Anthony Skillen, Sport 
Is For Losers, in ETHICS & SPORTS 169-81 (M.J. McNamee & S. J. Parry eds.,1998) (arguing sports 
are part of education, but not in the textbook way).  But see Steve Brisendine, Most Div. I & II 
Athletic Programs Lose Money, NCAA Study Says Revenue Isn’t Meeting Expenses, MILWAUKEE J.-
SENTINEL, Oct. 18, 1998 (no page numbers) (stating that 62.5 % of all male athletic programs lost 
money in 1997, compared to over 92% of women’s athletic programs that lost money over the same 
time period). 
 235. Sudha Setty, Leveling the Playing Field: Reforming the Office of Civil Rights to Achieve 
Better Title IX Enforcement,
 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 331, 352 (1999). 
 236. Daniel, supra note 5, at 306-07. 
 237. Id. at 307. 
 238. Players over the years have demanded a portion of the money they generate from their 
play.  Jack Carey, Drake Gets One-Year Probation for Violation, USA TODAY, July 20, 1995, at 
12C (quoting Joe Smith, former University of Maryland basketball standout, saying “players around 
the country have made basketball exciting . . . we should receive a cut of that money.”).  But see 
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The general definition of an amateur is one who plays sports 
because of an inner desire to compete without the need for 
compensation.239  The normal “student-athlete” receives numerous forms 
of compensation for his participation in intercollegiate athletics.240 It is 
obvious that the modern day intercollegiate athlete cannot fall within the 
definition of an “amateur.”241 
To supplement this theory, Congress has acknowledged that college 
athletics extend beyond the education provided at an institution.242 Even 
the NCAA has taken steps to show its acceptance of the profit center 
theory.243 
For this theory to achieve maximum success, several groups must 
take action.  First, the institution should retain the sole right to decide 
which sports are “business” and which sports are “amateur.”244  To 
facilitate this “freedom of choice,” Congress can enact new legislation 
that requires an institution to take affirmative steps to label each 
individual sport with one of the two permissible labels.245  Some 
                                                          
Edward H. Whang, Necessary Roughness: Imposing a Heightened Duty of Care on Colleges for 
Injuries of Student-Athletes, 2 SPORTS L.J. 25, 38 (1995) (arguing that college athletes should not be 
paid because most institutions consistently lose money each year on athletics). 
 239. Kenneth L. Shropshire, Legislation for the Glory of the Sport: Amateurism and 
Compensation, 1 SETON HALL J. OF SPORT L. 7, 10 (1991). 
 240. Generally, students receive room and board, tuition, books and other necessities needed 
for attendance at college.  See also Michael P. Acain, Revenue Sharing: A Simple Cure for the 
Exploitation of College Athletes, 18 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 307, 331 (1998).  The author of this article 
received many of the same forms of “compensation” for his participation in intercollegiate athletics 
at Malone College. 
 241. C.f., Steve Wulf, Tote That Ball, Lift That Revenue: Why Not Pay College Athletes, Who 
Put in Long Hours to Fill Stadiums and Coffers?, TIME, Oct. 21, 1996, at 84 (stating that college 
athletes should be paid, and the inference logically drawn is that if a person is paid for athletic 
competition he is no longer an amateur). See, e.g., Leonard M. Shulman, Comment, Compensation 
for Collegiate Athletes: A Run for More Than The Roses, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 701 (1995).  But 
see
 Timothy Davis, Reply to Sack and Staurowsky, 10 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 123 (1999) (claiming that 
the author is not ready yet to concede that college athletes are no longer amateurs, although it may 
become that way in the near future). 
 242. Daniel, supra note 5, at 300.  Congress promulgated the 1954 Tax Code to permit a 
college to collect a return on its sports investments.  Id.  In 1954, college athletics were exempted 
from the federal admission tax.  Id.  Finally, the NFL was prohibited from televising games on 
stations within seventy-five miles of an intercollegiate game.  ARTHUR A. FLEISHER III, ET AL., THE 
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION; A STUDY IN CARTEL BEHAVIOR 155 (1992). 
 243. See, e.g., Steve Weiberg, Final Four Feats Also Will Flatten SEC’s Wallets, USA TODAY, 
Apr. 6, 1994, at O1C. 
 244. Daniel, supra note 5, at 312.  In order to determine which sports fall into what categories, 
it seems that some external standards must be put in place.  Id.  Daniel suggests that the university 
should have the burden of either showing that the institution benefits academically or financially.  
Id. 
 245. Id. at 313.  Author also suggests that OCR could amend its regulations to reflect the goals 
36
Akron Law Review, Vol. 35 [2002], Iss. 1, Art. 5
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol35/iss1/5
REUSCHER1.DOC 1/2/02  1:34 PM 
2001] GIVING THE BAT BACK TO CASEY 153 
 
commentators view this theory as circumventing Title IX, achieved by 
labeling each sport as a “business” and therefore exempting it from a 
Title IX investigation.246  However, policies are in place that will deter 
an institution from designating non-revenue teams as businesses.247 
First, while the IRS has stated that scholarships are not taxable 
income, the tax consequence of an institution may increase and subject it 
to an “unrelated business income tax.”248  Second, an athlete on a team 
classified as a business is seen as an employee of the institution and 
under this view, the institution could face additional consequences.249  
The institution may acquire unlimited exposure through vicarious 
liability for illegal actions committed by the athletes during the 
progression of the sporting event.250  In addition, these employees may 
request the institution to provide the same benefits that teachers and 
maintenance persons receive.251 
While there are disadvantages to the use of the “profit center” 
theory, the advantages significantly outweigh the pitfalls.  By correctly 
utilizing this theory, many sports teams will remain in existence.252 
D.  Football Teams 253 
Another controversial issue within Title IX is how to promote 
                                                          
of this policy; however, this idea seems highly improbable.  Id.  The legislation would statutorily 
exclude the sports that the institution labeled as businesses from Title IX investigation.  Id. 
 246. Setty, supra note 235, at 352-53.  By removing these sports from the equation, the 
institution in effect is applying the Tower amendment.  Id.  Congress rejected this amendment in the 
1970’s.  Id. 
 247. See infra notes 248-51 and accompanying text. 
 248. Mark R. Whitmore, Denying Scholarship Athletes Worker’s Compensation: Do Courts 
Punt Away a Statutory Right?, 76 IOWA L. REV. 763, 779 n.94 (1991) (examining Rev. Ru. 77-263, 
1977-31 I.C.B. 8); Erik M. Jensen, Taxation, The Student Athlete, and the Professionalization of 
College Athletics, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 35 (maintaining that colleges will be subject to UBIT if they 
professionalize their athletic programs incorrectly). 
 249. Daniel, supra note 5, at 315-16. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Daniel Nestel, Athletic Scholarships: An Imbalance of Power Between the University and 
the Student-Athlete, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1401, 1418 (1992). The author notes that some of benefits that 
athletes could request include: “group life and dental insurance.” Id. 
 252. See infra note 283 (needing to eliminate the nagging unintended consequence of cutting 
men’s sports, which the courts have failed to accomplish). 
 253. While the majority of institutions would never drop their football teams, several 
institutions have been forced to disband the team in order to comply with Title IX.  Larry von Dyke, 
The Clock Runs Out On Vermont Football, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC. 10, Nov. 25, 1974 
(noting that other schools have followed Vermont’s route: Xavier University, University of San 
Francisco, Northern Washington University, Marquette University and University of Detroit). 
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compliance within schools that maintain football programs.254  The 
problem arises because the size of the football squad (an average 
Division IA team retains over 100 players) has no comparable women’s 
counterpart.255  While efforts have failed to exempt football from the 
strictures of Title IX,256 several alternatives are available to athletic 
departments that will allow increased compliance with Title IX.257 
First, the athletic department can cap the maximum number of 
players that may participate on the team.258  Presently, the NCAA allows 
up to eighty-five athletic scholarships.259  The basis for this argument is 
that the National Football League, which plays on the average five to six 
more games a year, limits the size of their roster.260 
However, proponents of this theory may not comprehend why these 
rules allow college teams to maintain a larger squad.  While an NFL 
team places an injured player on the injured reserve list and not counted 
as a member of the team, the collegiate squad counts everyone, 
including injured players.261 
Second, not all freshman who arrive on the college campus at age 
17 or 18 are ready for full contact their first year.262  By reducing the 
size of the squad, freshman brought in to redshirt and prepare for the 
subsequent years prematurely play a substantial role and significantly 
increase the risk of serious injury.263 
A second option available to an institution is to limit the 
scholarships available for the football team.264  By lowering the number 
                                                          
 254. Susan M. Shook, The Title IX Tug-Of-Way And Intercollegiate Athletics in the 1990’s: 
NonRevenue Men’s Teams Join Women Athletes in the Scramble for Survival, 71 IND. L.J. 773, 814 
(1996) (stating there are two alternatives for a school when they have a football team: (1) eliminate 
it and go on without it or (2) decrease the size of the team to allow compliance with Title IX). 
 255. Id.  See also Robert C. Farrell, Title IX Or College Football?, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 993, 
1052 (1995). 
 256. See supra notes 45-48 (allowing all sports to be exempt from Title IX or in the alternative 
to allow football to fall outside the calculation made to determine Title IX compliance). 
 257. See infra notes 258-68 and accompanying text.  However, it will be several years before 
the actual effects of these options are widely known. 
 258. See generally Ferrier, supra note 29, at 877-78; Setty, supra note 235, at 351-52; Farrell, 
supra
 note 255, at 1055 (arguing that the institution can lower the limit of football players even 
lower than the NCAA). 
 259. 1995-96 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, BYLAWS art. 15.5.5.1. 
 260. NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 1993-2000, art. XXXIII (the NFL permits a 
team to carry a maximum of fifty-three players during the season). 
 261. Setty, supra note 235, at 352; Blaine Newnham, College Football Blocks Way to 
Obtaining Gender Equity, SEATTLE TIMES, June 11, 1993, at C1. 
 262. Setty, supra note 235, at 352. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Farrell, supra note 255, at 1057. 
38
Akron Law Review, Vol. 35 [2002], Iss. 1, Art. 5
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol35/iss1/5
REUSCHER1.DOC 1/2/02  1:34 PM 
2001] GIVING THE BAT BACK TO CASEY 155 
 
of scholarships from the NCAA maximum of eighty-five to an agreed-
upon number, athletic departments could use the excess cash to add a 
women’s team or increase the availability of new equipment or facilities 
to other teams.265 
Third, a school could limit the number of coaches present on the 
staff in proportion to the number of players on the team after a reduction 
occurs.
266
  Finally, the athletic department can restrict the amount of 
wasteful spending done by the football team.  There is no reason a 
football team needs to stay in a luxury hotel the night before a home 
game.267  As noted above, the hundreds of thousands of dollars in 
savings can benefit newly added or already existing teams.268 
E.  Club and Intramural Teams 
Another viable option that may increase compliance with Title IX is 
the expansion of club and intramural teams to varsity status.269  By 
promoting a club team to varsity level, it increases the chance of 
compliance with Title IX while using a very small portion of the overall 
athletic budget.270 
Athletic directors can also demote certain male teams, which 
continually struggle or draw miniscule interest to club level, as these 
teams will still be able to participate in a variant form of intercollegiate 
competitiveness.271  However, as the Court in Cohen notes, teams will 
ultimately lose in priority rights to available practice times and practice 
                                                          
 265. Id.  Farrell also suggests that scholarships in general should be eliminated and only used 
for those in financial need.  Id.  His argument draws support from the American Council stating to 
the NCAA that the elimination of scholarships will bring back the amateur model and will 
correspond with the wishes of the majority of school presidents.  NY TIMES, Jan. 12, 1988, at D24. 
 266. 1995-96 NCAA OPERATING BYLAWS art. 11.7.2 limits the number of coaches to 12, 
which consists of one head coach, two graduate assistants and nine assistant coaches. 
 267. Farrell, supra note 255, at 1058.  Ed Sherman, Cost Crunching Crushing Colleges, 
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Mar. 3, 1997, S4 at 1, 3 (saying that Purdue University, Ohio State University 
and the University of Wisconsin have built practice facilities at costs in excess of nine million 
dollars). 
 268. Cf. supra note 265. 
 269. Wilson, supra note 184, at 436-37. 
 270. Id.  This option appears unlikely to be sufficient because the majority of the schools 
already are over-budget for the fiscal year or do not have enough money under their present budget 
to take on another team.  See supra notes 11-12. 
 271. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp at 978 (D.R.I. 1992) (Cohen I) (stating that the teams 
were still allowed to participate in intercollegiate competition if they could fund their needs and 
conform to both Ivy League and NCAA rules . . . and since they raised the required funds, the teams 
continued to be eligible for postseason and championship tournaments.). 
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F.  Additional Sources of Revenue 
Finally, with a little imagination, there are additional sources of 
revenue available to the institution.  First, the government could 
implement a system that provides bonuses to schools that have or have 
significantly progressed towards ultimate compliance with Title IX.273  
Second, a school could contract with a local corporation to donate 
money in which all athletic programs can use at their discretion.274 
Third, much to the dismay of students, institutions can raise 
student’s fees and ticket prices to athletic events by a small 
percentage.275  Fourth, and most controversial, is to establish a “melting 
pot” for private athletic donations in which a greater percentage of the 
“pot” is given to teams in dire need or for the establishment of new 
teams.276 
As we know, there is no foolproof way to increase compliance with 
Title IX.  However, the previously mentioned suggestions are starting 
blocks an institutional can utilize to increase the chances of compliance 
with Title IX without eliminating men’s athletics. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
As stated throughout this paper, the increase in the participation of 
women in intercollegiate athletics is beyond staggering.  But what most 
people fail to see, or choose not to see, is that this statute is failing 
miserably in promoting gender equity in athletics.  If Congress or the 
                                                          
 272. Id. at 982.  These athletic teams can also lose rights to athletic/medical staff, the use of 
locker rooms, and the best equipment. 
 273. Ferrier, supra note 29, at 883 (focusing on the University of Iowa and their ideas to 
promote compliance within the athletic system).  Ferrier states that besides giving direct money, the 
school could be provided with “government grants,” research grants or additional financial aid.  Id.  
See also
 Mark Brosley, Gender Equity is Forcing the Sexes to Take Sides, THE ATLANTA J. & 
CONST., May 22, 1993, at C1. 
 274. B. G. Brooks, CU Would Show War Without Nike, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Apr. 15, 2000 at 
18C.  Colorado University negotiated with Nike to supply outfits for players & coaches, and 
“provide annual compensation to the athletic department.”  Id. 
 275. O’Brien, supra note 42, at A1 (declaring that Utah State raised over $200,000 by this 
method).  The increased revenue collected from ticket prices should be earmarked for direct use by 
women’s athletics.  Ferrier, supra note 29, at 884. 
 276. Travis T. Tygart, Title IX: The Monitoring of Private Athletic Donations, 53 OKLA L. 
REV. 57, 73-75 (2000).  However, a private donor may be reluctant to contribute money to an 
institution of choice, if he may suspect that the donation will not go to the intended recipient.  Id. at 
75. 
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courts fail to take immediate action, modern day intercollegiate sports 
could cease to exist.277 
Luckily, several options are readily available to reconstruct the 
application of the statute to provide a genuinely equitable future for both 
genders.  The most important of these options is to eliminate the Cohen 
interpretation of the Policy Interpretation and the three-part test.278  
Courts should either discard this present interpretation or reform it so it 
includes the correct “qualified applicant pool.”279  Presently, the courts 
seem to care less about the percentage of women undergraduates that 
could not play or indicate no desire play athletics when it takes into 
account the whole undergraduate population for calculation. 
By reforming Title IX, the Courts and Congress can return Title IX 
to an anti-discrimination statute.280  Presently, Title IX operates a quota 
system which is in direct contradiction to the original intent and 
legislative history of the statute.281  This quota system is also 
inconsistent with established Equal Protection case law.282  The present 
system places the interests and abilities of women in higher regard than 
the same interests and abilities of men.283 
Unfortunately, due to extreme pressure from activist and Civil 
rights groups, easily persuaded judges have forgotten that both Equal 
Protection and Title IX apply to both genders.  There can be no 
disagreement as to whether gender equity is beneficial for our citizens, 
athletics and morality as a whole.  However, things must change, and 
they must change quickly. 
The alternatives examined throughout this comment are not “sure-
fire” methods of compliance; nor are they certain to change the biased 
application of Title IX.  What they can do is open people’s eyes to the 
atrocious inequity that is starting to plague male intercollegiate athletics.  
Men’s teams are not “sacrificial lambs” so the hopes and dreams of 
others may be realized.  Applying incorrect standards of evaluation to 
allow the elimination of one team for the formation of another is 
                                                          
 277. But see John Hawkins, Major College Reform Backed, WASHINGTON TIMES, Mar. 20, 
1991, at D1 (stating that a majority of people would support reform of college athletics). 
 278. See supra notes 195-13. 
 279. See supra notes 210-13. 
 280. Cheesebrough, supra note 36, at 300. 
 281. See supra notes 22-28 & 195-213. 
 282. See supra notes 214-32. 
 283. See supra Part III and notes 90-156 & 194-31 (dealing with the cases brought by women 
and men and their success rate in court). 
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illogical and grossly unfair.284 
Christopher Paul Reuscher 
 
                                                          
 284. The chart below represents the decline in certain men’s sports starting in 1982 and 
continuing on a steady decline throughout the 1994-95 school year.  Dr. Christine H.B. Grant, A 
Basic Title IX Presentation: Title IX and Gender Equity
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